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Abstract 
 
The present report is an EU-FP7-SOCIOEC Report giving an overview and critical evaluation 
of the current management measures implemented for the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries 
and the fish stocks involved in this. Also, this involves review and critical evaluation of the 
scientific advice supporting the fisheries management for the North Sea mixed demersal 
fisheries and the stocks involved herein.  
 
Management of the demersal roundfish and flatfish fisheries in the North Sea is conducted 
mainly through the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the yearly EU-Norway Bilateral 
Fishery Agreements. The prevailing management system and principle has been landing 
quotas (TAC, Total Allowable Catch) mainly based on the EU principle of relative stability in 
the international sharing of the TAC. Also, general effort limitations and technical measures 
are set for the EU and Norwegian fisheries on top of the TAC regulations. Technical measures 
have mainly aimed at reducing the retention and discard of the juveniles through gear 
measures and to protect the spawners and/or recruits in the fish populations through closures. 
Furthermore, the management is based on a set of national measures especially concerning 
control and enforcement measures, national distribution of the overall TAC, individual special 
technical measures, allocation (distribution) of national TACs to different fisheries and 
vessels including the share to e.g. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) or Vessel Quota 
Shares (VQSs).  
 
The management of the North Sea demersal fisheries has changed quite a lot over the last 
decades following the need to rebuild the fish stocks, and in particular the North Sea cod 
stock in relation to the present case study. The CFP has increasing focus towards 
implementing multi-annual or long term management plans (MAMPs, LTMPs) partly to 
avoid the annual political battles over setting the TAC. There has furthermore been a trend 
during the last decade to move away from the Precautionary Approach and towards 
Maximum Sustainable Yield as the overarching management objective and Harvest Control 
Rules (HCRs) based on this. There have been introduced increasingly restrictive fisheries-
based effort limitations with possibilities for exemption or for less drastic effort reductions 
provided that cod avoidance behavior can be demonstrated. Although the decision-makers 
under the CFP have had a reputation of consistently setting TACs way above the scientific 
advice, the development in recent years has been towards this gap being reduced. 
 
Management of the fisheries has undergone a number of structural and behavioral changes, 
and these have already yielded some positive results as the state of the demersal stocks in the 
North Sea have globally improved. The status of main demersal stocks has considerably 
improved over the last decade. Fishing mortality has globally decreased and biomass has 
increased, and most of the assessed demersal stocks are now within sustainable limits. Some 
issues remain with North Sea cod, for which recovery is slower. At present, cod is the limiting 
species for all the North Sea demersal fisheries. Over a time span from the 1960s landings of 
demersal stocks have declined with an accelerating decrease since the mid-1990s in line with 
the falling stock sizes and regulated reductions in total allowable catches (TACs). A clear 
decrease in the mean fishing mortality (F) is observed in the 2000-2010 period with current F 
values between Fmsy and Fpa, and the spawning stock biomass (SSB) has on average been 
above Bpa for the period 1983-2010 for the assessed stocks. The effort in the central North 
Sea and along the Norwegian waters has decreased as well as the number of operating fishing 
vessels (capacity). Overall, the nominal effort (kW-days) by European fleets using demersal 
trawl, seine, beam trawl and gillnet in the North Sea, Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel have 
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been substantially reduced (-20% between 2003 and 2011). Since 2000, the total fish biomass 
for exploited stocks in the North Sea is about 4-5 million tonnes with an increasing trend in 
the most recent years. Despite the decrease of landings and fishing mortality in the last recent 
decade, the overall recruitment has shown a clear decreasing trend from 1985-2010. The 
recent increase in SSB during the last decase, which is likely due to lower landings and 
fishing mortality levels in the last 15 years, indicate inclinations of the North Sea ecosystem 
to recover. However, this has not converted in higher recruitment levels in the most recent 
years in which there may be a time delay. 
 
There is a clear trend that both the gross profit and the net profit has improved from 2008-
2010 for the main fleets of the North Sea with the only exception of the Dutch beam trawlers 
18-24m, for which the gross profit decreased by nearly 90%. The positive development in 
economic performance measures can be a result of the structural changes that have recently 
occurred in many fisheries. There are fewer vessels sharing the available resources (reduction 
in over-capacity). Especially, the movement towards right-based systems is expected to have 
had positive effects on reducing the over-capacity and improving the economic performance 
of many fleets. Historically, EU subsidies over the years have contributed to making the fleet 
more efficient, so the success of the CFP in the area of developing an efficient fleet has 
historically contributed to its failure in relation to conserve fish stocks, as overcapacity is 
consistently mentioned as one of the fundamental reasons for the conservation failure 
historically.  
 
Employment in fishing as a social indicator is shrinking, not least for the North Sea, and has 
been so for many years. There are multiple explanations for this: i) individual vessels are 
getting more efficient, ii) consolidation of fleets whereby fewer vessels catch the available 
resources with noticeable decrease in number of operating fishing vessels, and iii) decreasing 
fishing opportunities in the shape of lower quotass. The raw number of fishers tells a story of 
a sector that in reality, at least in the prosperous countries around the North Sea, provides only 
few jobs.   
 
Despite the above trends indicating positive effects of the most recent fisheries management 
of the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries there are a row of general problems in the present 
management.  
 
Population dynamics with respect to recruitment variations, sub-populations and changes in 
distribution of several demersal North Sea stocks influenced by environmental factors besides 
fishery are not fully understood and taken into consideration in management (and 
management advice). Also, biological multi-species interactions between the stocks are not 
fully taken into account in the management of the stocks when setting the MSY management 
and exploitation limits for the stocks. Management is not based on broader ecosystem and 
multi-species objectives, but based mainly on single stock objectives. 
 
Also technical interactions between fisheries are not taken fully into account in management 
of the North Sea demersal fisheries. The fisheries targeting cod, whiting, haddock, saithe, 
flatfish and Nephrops in the North Sea and Kattegat-Skagerrak are mixed demersal fisheries 
for towed gears. Mixed fisheries considerations are of primary importance for the 
management of North Sea species. Single stock management is a cause of discarding in mixed 
fisheries, because individual stock management objectives may not be consistent with each 
other. As such, the TAC of one species may be exhausted before the TAC of another, leading 
to catches of valuable fish that cannot be landed resulting in over-quotas discard. 
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Overall, present management and fisheries policy is characterized by the CFP having in many 
ways taken  form of a classical intergovernmentalist, state-centric command-and-control, top-
down management system, where member states’ ministers in the Council have exercised 
strong control over the fisheries management measures which have been developed and 
adopted on the background of proposals from the Commission and the Parliament, though 
since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament has assumed a role of co-legislator 
alongside the Council. EC has identified the lack of stakeholder involvement as one of the 
major weaknesses of the CFP, recognizing that this fact clearly undermine its legitimacy. 
Establishment of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) with the 2003 CFP can be seen as 
the first formal attempt to generate a network of multi-national, multi-interest advisory 
organizations with a strong regional focus among other involving resource users in the 
decision making. However, the RACs have at present only an advisory function on decisions 
and are not formally integrated directly in management on a regional basis, i.e. the RAC 
system is primarily intended to provide a regional stakeholder perspective to the 
Commission’s deliberations rather than providing stakeholders with real decision-making 
authority. RACs constitute, nevertheless, a move towards regionalization of the fisheries 
policy. 
 
Present management is, furthermore, characterized by a high degree of complexity, 
bureaucracy, and examples of micro-management where different management systems and 
measures are implemented in parallel making evaluation of impact of the individual measures 
and systems very complicated and the system suffers from lack of transparency. With respect 
to the complexity the different management measures are acting top of each other with impact 
on the same fisheries and stocks at the same time (and with time overlap in their 
implementation) creating a very complex management and associated advisory system, where 
it is difficult to distinguish specific effects and impacts of each individual measures 
implemented. Accordingly, it is also very difficult to make scientific management evaluation 
and advice associated to the individual measures.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The present report is an EU-FP7-SOCIOEC Report giving an overview and critical evaluation 
of the current management measures implemented for the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries 
and the fish stocks involved in this. Also, this involves review and critical evaluation of the 
scientific advice supporting the fisheries management for the North Sea mixed demersal 
fisheries and the stocks involved herein.  
 
The report is based on SOCIOEC project work by project involved scientists where input on 
the above issues from various stakeholders is also included.   
 
It is to be used in the continued project work on evaluation of current management measures 
and in this context propose and evaluate alternative/emerging management measures and 
procedures to improve existing fisheries management. In present context this is with focus on 
the case study of the North Sea mixed demersal consume fisheries for roundfish, flatfish and 
Nephrops.  
 
 
2. Historical background 
 
Management of the North Sea demersal consume fisheries and their exploited stocks: The 
management of North Sea demersal fisheries has changed quite a lot over the last decades, to 
a large extent following the need to rebuild the fish stocks, and in particular the North Sea cod 
stock. Since the 2002 reform of the CFP, there has been increasing focus in Europe towards 
implementing multi-annual or long-term management plans (MAMPs, LTMPs), partly to 
avoid the annual political battles over setting the TAC, and partly as a result of knowledge 
drawn from successful fisheries management. Additionally, there has been the generic trend 
during the decade to move away from the Precautionary Approach and towards Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) as the overarching management objective. Both aspects are 
particularly true in the North Sea, where most demersal stocks are now managed through 
MSY-driven harvest control rule, accompanied or not by additional measures. (ICES, 2012a). 
A major driver of changes has been the implementation of the two “cod plans”, first in 2004 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004) then in 2008 (Council Regulation (EC) No 
1342/2008) which introduced increasingly restrictive fisheries-based effort limitations. 
Meanwhile, as one of the first example in Europe, the 2008 plan introduced also some 
possibilities for exemption or for less drastic effort reductions provided that cod avoidance 
behavior could be demonstrated, and this has triggered a variety of alternative responses, 
often industry-led, to be experimented over the last couple of years, including e.g. new 
selective trawls, real-time closures and Catch Quota Management trials involving Fully 
Documented Fisheries (see Kraak et al. (2012) for a global discussion around this cod plan).  
All together, it is certain that the management of the fisheries in the North Sea has undergone 
a number of structural and behavioral changes, and these have already yielded some positive 
results as the state of demersal stocks in the North Sea have globally improved, many stocks 
being now within sustainable limits and exploited around Fmsy target (ICES, 2012a) 
 
The main changes that have occurred in the recent (last 10 years) management history of the 
North Sea mixed demersal consume fisheries in relation to the CFP are:  
 
• Introduction of Long Term Management Plans for cod, haddock, whiting, plaice and 
sole in the North Sea, and for cod in the Kattegat area; 
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• Introduction of effort restrictions (kw-day regulations) in the fishery on top of the 
TACs regulations; 
• Introduction of ITQs and FKAs in the fishery on national levels;  
• Additional technical measures including fishing closures in relation to certain fish 
species and stocks, e.g. cod and plaice in the North Sea and Kattegat 
• Introduction of fully documented fishery trials with among other camera monitoring 
on board fishing vessels, which in a future management perspective can be used in 
relation to catch quota management, discard bans and certification of fisheries. 
 
Recent enforcement of the EU Habitat Directive has resulted in a row of NATURA 2000 
marine protected areas. Only few of these influence the fishery, and only a very few affect the 
North Sea mixed demersal fisheries. Among those are restrictions in relation to gillnet fishery 
in the NATURA 2000 areas appointed according to harbor porpoise protection.  
 
Emerging spatial explicit fisheries management measures can in future be expected not only 
to be based on the EU Common Fisheries Policy (EU CFP), e.g. fishing closures to protect 
certain stocks and/or life stages, or the Habitat Directive, e.g. NATURA 2000 areas, but also 
in relation to the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive (EU MSFD). In relation to the 
latter spatial explicit management of fishery is likely to also depend on broader marine 
management, where also spatial planning of other sectors use of the marine environment is 
considered (e.g. renewable energy, fossil fuel extraction, transport, recreational use such as 
tourism and recreational fishery, etc.). 
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3. Fleets and fisheries 
 
A number of information is available in the STECF (EU Scientific, Technical and Economic 
Commitee for Fisheries) reports on the evaluation of effort regimes (STECF, 2012c. STECF-
12-16), which have collected effort and catch information for most EU fisheries since 2003. 
Economic data are found in the STECF Annual Economic Report (STECF, 2012a. STECF 
12-10), but the compatibility of the two data sets is limited due to differences in definition and 
collection in the transversal data. In addition for the North Sea, an alternative fleet-based data 
collection is taking place within ICES, and a combined data call is issued, fulfilling the needs 
of both single-species assessment and advice (WGNSSK, ICES 2012a, www.ices.dk) and the 
mixed-fisheries advice (WGMIXFISH, ICES 2012b). A number of handy aggregations have 
been performed on this dataset, which then contains fewer fleets and métiers categories 
compared to the STECF data above, and is also fully linked with the biological data. These 
data were also merged as much as possible with the available economic data during a JRC 
workshop, WKBEM 2012, leading to an operational bio-economic dataset linking assessment 
data with catches, effort and economy at the fleet and métier level. These various data are the 
key sources of information used below. 
 
 
3.1 Economic Results for the North Sea Fisheries 
 
The main fleets of the North Sea are defined as the 15 fleets that have the highest value of 
landings in 2010. These fleets are shown in Table 3.1.1 for the period 2008-2011. Overall, the 
landings value increased from 654 million Euro to 755 million Euro from 2008 to 2011, 
corresponding to an increase of 16% (prices not adjusted for inflation 1).  
 
Table 3.1.1: Value of landings (million Euro) for the main fleets of the North Sea  
 
Country Length Gear type 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Denmark 18-24 m DTS 13.4 13.2 16.2 16.3 
Denmark 24-40 m DTS 38.0 34.4 39.4 36.4 
Denmark >40 m DTS 82.0 72.7 137.6 155.2 
France >40 m TM 0.0 0.0 20.7 0.0 
Germany 24-40 m DTS 13.0 13.6 14.6 14.1 
Netherlands 18-24 m TBB 58.9 43.8 46.2 36.0 
Netherlands 24-40 m TBB 26.6 26.1 25.5 19.3 
Netherlands >40 m TBB 113.9 109.3 120.4 105.1 
United Kingdom 0-10 m FPO 26.1 20.7 20.3 25.2 
United Kingdom 12-18 m DTS 22.0 17.8 17.0 17.2 
United Kingdom 18-24 m DTS 89.1 75.0 81.9 85.7 
United Kingdom 24-40 m DTS 80.2 69.9 77.0 81.7 
United Kingdom >40 m DTS 11.8 10.3 15.8 15.7 
United Kingdom >40 m PS 65.0 67.1 67.6 131.4 
United Kingdom >40 m TBB 13.4 12.8 15.9 16.0 
Total value (NS)     653.5 586.8 716.0 755.1 
Source: Data Collection Framework (DCF) of the European Commission;                                                                                                 
Notes: DTS=demersal trawl and seine; TM=pelagic trawl and seine; TBB=beam trawl; FPO=pots and traps; PS=purse seine 
                                                          
1 The average annual inflation rate in Europe from 2009-2011 was approximately 1,5% (Eurostat) 
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A general trend is that the large vessels that catch pelagic and/or industrial species in the NS 
(the large Danish demersal trawlers and seiners is to a large extent targeting pelagic species) 
have significantly increased their landings value, while the landings value for the smaller 
vessels below 18 m and the Dutch beam trawlers have decreased during the period.   
 
The cost and earnings for the main fleets of the North Sea are presented in Table 3.1.2. Due to 
the characteristics of the data collection framework (DCF), fleet costs are gathered in an 
aggregated way across seas, i.e. fleet costs are not available for regions such as the North Sea, 
Baltic Sea, Norwegian Sea, Irish Sea. This is an issue for most of the included fleets, except 
the Dutch beam trawlers that almost solely operate in the North Sea. Therefore, the landings 
value of all regions, and not only the landings value of the North Sea, is included as income in 
Table 3.1.2. The proportion of the North Sea landings value to the income is also included in 
the table.  
 
The income and costs of the fleets are depending on the total size of the fleet, which is 
combination of the number of vessels that is operating in the given fleet and the size of the 
vessels. To have a performance measure that is comparable across fleets, the net profit per 
income is calculated. From this measure, it can be seen that the larger demersal trawl and 
seine fleets are performing well, compared to demersal trawl and seine fleets below 24m. For 
the Dutch beam trawlers, there also seems to be increasing returns to scale, i.e. the large 
Dutch beam trawlers above 40 m are performing relative better than the ‘TBB 24-40 m’, 
while the ‘TBB 18-24m’ have economic loss.    
 
Table 3.1.2: Cost and earnings (million Euro) for the main North Sea fleets. 
 
Country Length 
Gear 
type Income 
North Sea 
landings 
value / 
income 
Variable 
costs 
Gross 
profit 
Depreciation 
and 
interests 
Net 
profit 
Net profit 
per 
income 
Denmark 18-24m DTS 47.2 0.34 36.1 11.1 10.2 0.9 0.02 
Denmark 24-40m DTS 59.2 0.67 39.9 19.3 12.9 6.4 0.11 
Denmark >40m DTS 176.3 0.78 76.8 99.5 40.1 59.4 0.34 
France >40m TM 20.7 1.00 20.4 0.4 0.5 -0.2 -0.01 
Germany 24-40m DTS 17.7 0.83 12.4 5.3 1.2 4.0 0.23 
Netherlands 18-24m TBB 46.4 1.00 45.3 1.0 6.0 -4.9 -0.11 
Netherlands 24-40m TBB 26.1 0.98 22.9 3.2 1.4 1.8 0.07 
Netherlands >40m TBB 121.4 0.99 88.9 32.5 10.7 21.8 0.18 
United Kingdom 0-10m FPO 67.5 0.30 51.8 15.7 10.3 5.3 0.08 
United Kingdom 12-18m DTS 55.3 0.31 45.9 9.4 2.8 6.6 0.12 
United Kingdom 18-24m DTS 109.5 0.75 90.8 18.7 8.4 10.3 0.09 
United Kingdom 24-40m DTS 132.1 0.58 96.6 35.5 7.1 28.4 0.21 
United Kingdom >40m DTS 45.9 0.34 32.9 13.0 2.5 10.4 0.23 
United Kingdom >40m PS 215.4 0.31 150.5 64.9 29.4 35.5 0.16 
Total     1140.6 0.61 811.2 329.5 143.5 185.9 0.16 
Source: Data Collection Framework (DCF) of the European Commission                                                                                                   
Notes: 1Income is calculated as the value of landings plus other income; 2Interests are calculated as the opportunity cost of 
capital; The fleet “GBR,>40m,TBB” is not included in the table, since there are no economic data available for this fleet in 
DCF  
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3.2 Size/Average length/HP of vessels  
 
As seen in the tables 3.1.1-2 above, North Sea fisheries include both small coastal fisheries, 
medium size vessels and some very large fleet segments, targeting industrial species but also 
demersal species such as saithe. 
 
For the whole area North Sea-Skagerrak-Eastern Channel in 2011, the effort from vessels 
<10m was 10% of the total effort in this area (STECF, 2012c) 
 
 
3.3 Type of activities in terms of gear and target species  
 
The fisheries targeting primarily cod, whiting, haddock, saithe, monkfish, flatfish and 
Nephrops in the North Sea and Kattegat-Skagerrak are mixed demersal fisheries for towed 
gears. Beyond the main commercial species listed above, the mixed demersal fisheries catch a 
variety of other species. A typical Shetland whitefish trawler reports more than 50 different 
species 2, and Deporte et al. (2012) reported almost 300 different species in a regional data set 
combining North Sea log-books trawling records from five countries. 
 
Mixed-fisheries considerations are of primary importance for the management of North Sea 
species including cod. Single-stock management is a cause of discarding in mixed fisheries, 
because individual management objectives may not be consistent with each other. As such, 
the TAC of one species may be exhausted before the TAC of another, leading to catches of 
valuable fish that cannot be landed legally. For example, cod are targeted by some fleets, but 
are also caught as part of mixed fisheries catching haddock, whiting, Nephrops, plaice, and 
sole. Cod discards relative to catch have declined from the highest on record in 2008 to a just 
above the historical average in 2011 (from 50% to 25%, weight of cod discarded from the 
total estimated cod catch). Whiting are caught in mixed demersal roundfish fisheries, fisheries 
targeting flatfish, the Nephrops fisheries, and as bycatches in the industrial sandeel and 
Norway pout fisheries. Haddock are primarily caught by demersal trawlers (single, twin, and 
pair), and (to a lesser extent) by seiners. Haddock is a specific target for some fleets, but is 
also caught as part of a mixed fishery catching cod, whiting, and Nephrops. Saithe in the 
North Sea are mainly taken in a directed trawl fishery in deep water along the Northern Shelf 
edge and the Norwegian Trench. Analyses show a substantial shift in the Norwegian and 
German trawlers’ fishing pattern after 2008, both in time and spatial distribution. The 
importance of the fisheries on the spawning aggregations in the first quarter of the year has 
declined. Plaice is predominantly caught by beam trawlers in the central part of the North Sea 
with a minimum mesh size of 100–120 mm depending on area. A mixed fishery with sole in 
the southern North Sea takes place with a minimum mesh size of 80 mm. This mesh size 
catches plaice under the minimum landing size of 27 cm, which causes high discard rates (in 
the range of 50% by weight). The discard ratio in the catch has declined in recent years. 
 
There is a great variety of gears and target species in the North Sea (STECF 2012d, STECF-
EWG 12-12; STECF 2012b, STECF-12-14; ICES 2012 a, b). Demersal activities 
(corresponding to the “regulated gears” evaluated by STECF with reference to the effort 
regulations) represent 70% of the effort in the area. Main demersal species include roundfish 
(cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, monkfish), flatfish (plaice, sole mainly but many other species 
are also caught), crustaceans (Nephrops, brown shrimp). Additionally, a number of non TAC 
species are also targeted in the Southern area and in the English Channel, including squids, 
                                                          
2 nsrac.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Shetland-Multi-Species-Fishery-Report-2013-02-05.docx 
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cuttlefish, sea bass, etc. (Deporte et al., 2012). Noticeably, there has been an increase in 
catches of a number of species less traditionally associated with the North Sea over the recent 
years. These are mainly species living in warmer waters and which are increasingly observed 
in the North Sea, likely in conjunction with global warming. In the Southern North Sea, there 
is for example increased abundance of gurnards and striped red mullet, and in the Northern 
North Sea there has been a boom in Northern hake abundance. These new species create new 
challenges for the management of mixed-fisheries, as the relative stability, based on historical 
landings patterns, does not provide adequate quotas opportunities for the North Sea countries. 
 
Main fishing gears include otter trawls and beam trawls, but also gillnet and trammel nets are 
important in some local areas. 
 
In terms of fleets and métiers, a number of definitions and classifications exist (Deporte et al., 
2012, Ulrich et al., 2012). We describe here the classification retained by ICES WGMIXFISH 
(ICES, 2012b), combining métiers information as from the DCF and fleet segments as of the 
STECF AER, and aggregating these into a limited number of fleets and fisheries following 
the definition of the Cod Plan (EC 1432/2008). WGMIXFISH métiers are thus defined as 
combinations of gear, mesh size and area (North Sea (area 4), Skagerrak (area 3AN) or 
Eastern Channel (area 7D)). In 2012, WGMIXFISH identified 39 national fleets from nine 
countries. These fleets engage in one to four different métiers each, resulting in 88 
combinations of country*fleet*métier*area. The WGMIXFISH data set links these to the 
main commercial species (cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, plaice, sole and Nephrops), but as 
mentioned above a great number of other species are also caught.  
 
 
3.4 Spatial distribution of fishing effort  
 
Overall, there is distribution of demersal effort over most of the North Sea (Figure 3.4.1), but 
this hides large differences across gears, reflecting the diversity of fisheries and target species.  
Many maps are available in STECF EWG 12-12, showing distribution of effort for the main 
gears, and selected maps are shown in Appendix A of the present report. 
 
The Otter trawls/seines with 100+mm mesh (TR1) are the main roundfish gear and are mainly 
used along the Norwegian trench and the shelf edge. There is a constant concentration of 
effort in the Skagerrak area around the Shetlands, while the area between these two 
concentrations has decreased over the years.  
 
Otter trawls with 70-99 mm mesh size (TR2) are the main Nephrops gears, but are also used 
for targeting whiting. They are now mostly used on the places of the largest Nephrops 
Functional Units (i.e. in the Fladen ground area and along the English and Scottish coast) as 
well as in the Skagerrak and in areas where whiting is fished, for example the English 
Channel. The effort in the Central North Sea and along the Norwegian waters has decreased.  
Beam trawls with mesh size 70 to120 mm (BT2) are mainly used in the southern North Sea 
up to the 50m depth line to fish for flatfish. The distribution of effort has moved south in 
recent years. One explanation could be that fishermen want to target sole and avoid plaice due 
to low market prices.  
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Figure 3.4.1. Annual fishing effort (hours fished) of effort regulated gear groups per rectangle 
in 2011 (left panel) and averaged for the period 2003-2011 (right panel). 
Static gears (GN1 and GT1) have traditionally been localised closer to the shores, often in 
patchy fishing grounds (Figure A.6 and A.7). There are slight indications that fishing grounds 
for these gears have contracted in recent years.  
 
 
3.5 Harvested stocks and resources  
 
Recent trends in the main harvested stocks and resources in the North Sea demersal mixed 
fisheries are described on a stock-by-stock basis in the ICES single stock assessment working 
group reports with single-species assessment and advice (WGNSSK, ICES 2012a), and latest 
advice by fish stock is available on the ICES website in the single stock advice sheets 
provided by ICES (www.ices.dk). The main trends for the main stocks in the North Sea 
demersal mixed consume fisheries are summarized below. 
 
The main aspect to bring forward is that the status of main demersal stocks has considerably 
improved over the last decade (ICES, 2012a). Fishing mortality has globally decreased and 
biomass has increased, and most of the assessed demersal stocks are now within sustainable 
limits. Some issues remain with North Sea cod, which recovery is slower due to a number of 
reasons (Kraak et al., 2012), but nevertheless the stock is improving gradually.  
 
In 2012, ICES offers mixed-fisheries advice for the first time (ICES, 2012b). In contrast to 
single-species advice there is no single recommendation for mixed fisheries but rather a range 
of plausible scenarios, assuming fishing patterns and catchability in 2012 and 2013 
unchanged from those in 2011. Major differences between the outcomes of the various 
scenarios indicate potential undershoot or overshoot of the TACs corresponding to the single-
species advice. As a result, fleet dynamics may change, but cannot be determined.  
 
More general biological trends in the development of the stocks and ecosystem considerations 
in relation to this are also provided in the single stock assessment working groups (ICES 
WGNSSK, 2012a; ICES HAWG, www.ices.dk) described under Section 3.6. Broader North 
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Sea ecosystem developments and aspects in relation to harvesting the resources and fisheries 
management is given in Section 8.1 of the present report as summarized in STECF (2012e): 
Development of the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM) in European 
Seas. STECF-11-13. 
 
Recent trends in developments of main stocks in the North Sea mixed demersal consume 
fisheries based on the ICES 2012 advice (ICES, 2012a and associated Advice Summaries, 
www.ices.dk) are summarized as follows:. 
 
Cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and Eastern Channel: 
There has been a gradual improvement in the status of the stock over the last few years. SSB 
has increased from the historical low in 2006, but remains just below Blim. Fishing mortality 
declined from 2000 and is now below Fpa, but is estimated to be well above FMSY. Recruitment 
since 2000 has been poor. The proportion of discards is still high relative to the historical 
period. The main sources of uncertainty are the estimation of unallocated removals and the 
assumption of fishing mortality. 
 
Haddock in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
Fishing mortality has been below Fpa and around FMSY and SSB has been above MSY 
Btrigger since 2001. Recruitment is characterized by occasional large year classes, the last of 
which was the strong 1999 year class. Apart from the 2005 and 2009 year classes which are 
about average, recent recruitment has been poor. 
 
Whiting in the North Sea and Eastern Channel: 
The perception of the stock abundance has been revised upwards, due to changes in predation 
estimates. However, the trends in stock dynamics are unchanged. The improvement of 
predation estimates as well as the quality of landings and discard data have lead to a 
significant revision of the perception of the stock. Overall, the quality of the assessment is 
considered to have improved. Discards are an important component of the catch. The 
sensitivity of the assessment outcomes to the raising procedure of discard data as well as 
whether the discard sampling programme coverage is sufficient have not been explored. SSB 
is around the average of the time-series. Fishing mortality has been stable with minor 
fluctuations since 2003. Recruitment was low between 2003 and 2007, then increased 
slightly, but has remained below average since 2008.  
 
Saithe in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
SSB has been above Bpa since 1997 but has declined since 2005 towards Bpa. Fishing 
mortality has fluctuated around FMSY since 1997. Recruitment has been below average since 
2006. The stock biomass is estimated to be close to Bpa and recruitment estimates for the 
terminal year are uncertain. The forecast and resulting advice are highly sensitive to the 
recruitment estimate. 
 
Plaice in the North Sea: 
The plaice stock has been within safe biological limits as defined by the multiannual 
management plan since 2005. The sole stock has been within safe biological limits in terms of 
fishing mortality since 2008, while SSB has been slightly fluctuating around the biomass limit 
(Bpa=35 kt) since 2008. Both the North Sea plaice and sole stocks have been within safe 
biological limits in the last two years. Consequently, ICES concludes that the objectives of 
stage 1 of the management plan are currently met and provides advice based on the plan’s 
TAC setting procedure acknowledging to be in a transitional stage at present.  
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Sole in the North Sea: 
The sole stock has been within safe biological limits in terms of fishing mortality since 2008, 
while SSB has been slightly fluctuating around the biomass limit (Bpa=35 kt) since 2008. 
Both the North Sea plaice and sole stocks have been within safe biological limits in the last 
two years. Consequently, ICES concludes that the objectives of stage 1 are currently met and 
provides advice based on the plan’s TAC setting procedure acknowledging to be in a 
transitional stage at present (as stipulated in article 5 of the EC regulation) 
 
Hake in Division IIIa, Subareas IV, VI, and VII, and Divisions VIIIa,b,d (Northern stock): 
The spawning biomass has been increasing since 1998 and is estimated to be record high in 
2011.Fishing mortality has been decreasing in recent years, but is still above FMSY. 
Recruitment fluctuations appear to be without substantial trend over the whole series.After 
several high recruitments in 2006 to 2008, the last two recruitments are estimated to be low. 
Hake is caught in mixed fisheries together with megrim,anglerfish, and Nephrops. Discards of 
juvenile hake can be substantial in some areas and fleets. An important increase in landings 
has occurred in the northern part of the distribution area (Division IIIa, and subareas IVand 
VI) in recent years.  
 
Anglerfish (Lophius piscatorius and L. budegassa) in Division IIIa, and Subareas IV and VI: 
Due to the uncertainty in the landings data, ICES is not able to advice and catch. The stock 
status is not known, but recent surveys indicate a decline in abundance and biomass since 
2008. 
 
Megrim (Lepidorhombus spp.)in DivisionsIVa and Via: 
Fishing mortality has been below FMSYfor almost the full time-series and the biomass well 
above MSY Btrigger. There are two separate TAC areas for megrim, SubareasVI and IV, but 
there is little evidence to suggest that the megrim in Subarea IV and Division VIa are separate 
stocks. ICES (2011b) concluded that megrim in Divisions VIa and IVa should be be treated as 
a single stock and megrim in Division VIb (Rockall) should be treated as a separate stock.  
  
 
3.6 Ecosystem Considerations in relation to relevant single stock assessment 
 
Ecosystem considerations in relation to the addressed individual species and single stock 
advice are provided by ICES through the ICES WGNSSK Advisory Sheets and Stock 
Summaries (ICES, 2012a; www.ices.dk). This has for the main individual stocks been 
summarized below while broader ecosystem considerations for the North Sea in relation to 
fisheries management is summarized in Section 8.1.  
 
Cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and Eastern Channel: 
Cod are widely distributed throughout the North Sea, but there are indications of sub-stocks. 
Genetic studies have indicated two subpopulations with long-term differences in recruitment 
trends, and largely inhabiting different regions of the North Sea, with cod from the deep-water 
subpopulation not expected to re-colonize depleted areas in the southern North Sea. There has 
been an apparent northerly shift in the mean latitudinal distribution of the stock in the North 
Sea. However, this is not thought to be due to cod migrating from the south to the north in 
response to climate change. More likely, cod in the North Sea are composed of a complex of 
more or less isolated sub-stocks and there do appear to be long-term differences in 
recruitment trends. The presence of subpopulations largely inhabiting different regions of the 
North Sea will mean that there is the potential for regional differences in mortality, because 
18 
 
cod from the Northern deep-water subpopulations would not be expected to re-colonize areas 
depleted in the southern North Sea. The contracted range of the North Sea cod stock can be 
linked to reduced abundance as well as climate factors. 
The distribution of 0-group cod (recruits) over the last 10–15 years has shifted towards the 
eastern part of the North Sea region (i.e. the Skagerrak and Kattegat). This means that the 
abundance of recruits is stable and shows no trends in the eastern part, whereas in the North 
Sea, a pronounced decline is clearly discernible. This change in distribution of cod recruits is 
likely to reflect changes (erosion) of the stock structure in the North Sea, so that the only 
productive units left in the North Sea are those which tend to use the eastern North Sea region 
as a nursery area.  
Recent recruitments have been low, with possible influence of changes in the availability of 
food resources for cod larvae to increasing predation pressure. There is evidence of 
cannibalism and seal predation. Multispecies model runs estimate a decrease in cannibalism 
rates for age 1 and age 2 cod at current low stock levels, while seal predation on ages 3 to 6 
has increased over the years due to an increase in seal abundance. Harbour porpoises also take 
a substantial amount of cod up to age 3. 
Fishing mortality rates have been reduced from 2000 and the stock has increased since 2006. 
The low average age of the spawning stock may reduce its reproductive capacity as first-time 
spawners may reproduce less successfully than older fish, a factor that could be a contributor 
to continued low recruitment. 
Gillnet fishery for cod takes bycatches of harbour porpoise. Since 2001, effort reductions in 
this fishery have likely led to decreased bycatches. Hiddink et al. (2006) estimates that in 
areas of bottom trawl activity in the North Sea, benthic biomass and production is reduced by 
56% and 21% respectively, compared with an unfished situation. 
 
Haddock in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
The North Sea haddock stock exhibits sporadic high recruitment, leading to dominant year 
classes in the fishery. These large year classes often grow more slowly than less abundant 
year classes, possibly due to density-dependent effects. Recruitment appears poorly 
determined by either spawning-stock biomass or egg production. Haddock primarily prey on 
benthic and epibenthic invertebrates, sandeels, and herring eggs. Haddock are an important 
prey species, mainly for saithe and other large gadoids.  
Haddock growth may be linked to water temperature. Warmer waters may lead to faster 
growth in early life stages, but also to faster maturation and a lower maximum size. There are 
indications that haddock recruitment success is determined, in part, by the available area of 
suitable substrate at settlement time. 
 
Whiting in the North Sea and the Eastern Channel: 
The spatial distribution of whiting is considered to have changed over the last decade. This 
may represent a contraction to a sub-stock structure that coincides with the main spawning 
areas in the North Sea. The 2011 key run of the North Sea multispecies model (SMS), on 
which natural mortality estimates for this stock are based, indicates that whiting is a major 
prey component in the diet of many piscivorous fish and marine mammals.Whiting are largely 
mature from age 2, which means that recruitment can heavily influence the SSB in the 
following year at low stock sizes.  
 
Saithe in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
The juveniles (ages 0–2 years) generally occur in shallow coastal areas where they are 
protected from large fisheries. The fish are long-lived (20+ years) and tend to form large 
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aggregations to a higher extent than for instance cod. Saithe starts to mature at age 4 (15% 
mature) and at age 7 all fish can be regarded as being mature. 
A decrease in the mean weight-at-age has been observed since the mid-1980s, but this trend 
has now been reversed. Current information is insufficient to establish whether these 
reductions are linked to changes in the environment. There is no indication that the observed 
decline in weight-at-age is density dependent. 
 
Plaice in the North Sea: 
Plaice is a bottom dwelling species, mainly feeding on annelids and molluscs. Plaice 
aggregate at spawning grounds in the first quarter of the year. The condition factor for plaice 
is highest in summer/autumn on the more dispersed feeding grounds. These feeding grounds 
are generally located more northerly than the spawning grounds. 
Juvenile plaice have been distributed more offshore in recent years. This could be linked to 
environmental changes in the productivity or changes in the temperature of the southern 
North Sea, but these links have not been shown conclusively. The distribution shift of plaice 
increased the bycatch of small plaice further offshore. 
The mixed plaice and sole fishery is dominated by bottom trawls, with bycatch of both 
commercial and non-commercial species and a physical impact on the seabed. Bottom 
trawling impacts biomass, production, and species richness. For plaice, the size selectivity 
may lead to a shift in the age and size at maturation, which means individuals start spawning 
earlier. For the North Sea, an ecosystem model showed that the beam-trawl fleet reduced 
benthic biomass and production by 56% and 21%, respectively, compared with an un-fished 
situation. Chronic fishing has caused a shift from communities dominated by relatively 
sessile, emergent, and high biomass species to communities dominated by infaunal, smaller-
bodied fauna. (ICES, 2012a). 
The flatfish benchmark in 2010 recommended to explore the potential to perform an 
integrated assessment of the continuum of plaice stocks from the Baltic to the English 
Channel. ICES is in the process of evaluating the identity of different plaice stocks which may 
imply changes in assessment units as well as in management areas.  
 
Sole in the North Sea: 
Sole is a nocturnal predator and therefore more susceptible to capture by fisheries at night 
than in daylight. 
Sole is mainly caught by the beam-trawl fleet working with 80 mm mesh. In recent years, an 
increasing proportion of the traditional beam trawl fleet has switched to sumwing and/or pulse 
trawl for which ecosystem effects is not fully known. The mixed plaice and sole fishery is 
dominated by bottom trawls, with bycatch of both commercial and non-commercial species 
and a physical impact on the seabed. Bottom trawling impacts biomasses and biological 
benthic production, and species richness (biodiversity). The impacts of trawling differ among 
benthic habitats and are likely to be more important in deeper water with silty sediments than 
in shallow areas characterized by sandy grounds. 
 
More general North Sea ecosystem considerations in relation to fisheries management is 
described in Section 8.1 of the present report. 
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4. Management processes 
 
4.1 Science and provision of scientific managment advice 
 
Overall, international bodies delivering scientific advice for fisheries management include the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES, www.ices.dk) and the EU 
Scientific, Technical and Economic Commitee for Fisheries (STECF, at European level, 
https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/web/stecf/about-stecf). This advice is provided to the EU and the 
National Governments as well as to involved stakeholders. 
 
At the ICES level, there is provided single-species advice on a fish stock-by-stock basis in the 
ICES assessment working groups performing single-species assessment. For the stocks 
involved in the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries, this is covered by the ICES Working 
Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak (WGNSSK, 
ICES 2012a). Single stock advice sheets are provided by ICES (see Sections 3.5 and 3.6) 
 
Multi-species considerations in the biological advice are also provided by ICES, involving 
biological interactions between fish species, e.g. predation of one species on another. For the 
North Sea, multi-species considerations are among other covered by the Working Group on 
Integrated Assessment in the North Sea (ICES WGINOSE) and Working Group on the Multi-
Species Assessment Methods (WGSAM). The multi-species considerations are written in 
under ecosystem considerations in the single stock advice sheets provided by ICES.  
 
In 2012, ICES offered mixed-fisheries advice for the first time (ICES WGMIXFISH, 2012b). 
In contrast to single-species advice, there is no single recommendation by stock for mixed 
fisheries but rather a range of plausible fishing effort scenarios (fishing patterns and 
catchability) and evaluation of their impacts on the stocks and the quota up-take. The mixed 
fisheries considerations are written into the single stock advice sheets by ICES as well. 
 
Broader North Sea ecosystem developments and aspects in relation to harvesting the 
resources and fisheries management are also provided by ICES and summmarized in the 
STECF (2012e): Development of the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM) 
in European Seas. STECF-11-13 (see Section 8.1). Also, broader ecosystem considerations 
are covered to some extent in the single stock advice sheets provided by ICES. 
 
The advice process is organized through gathering of international fisheries biological 
scientists from national fisheries research institutes throughout the year at different ICES 
expert group meetings. This feed among other into specific STECF expert working groups on 
fisheries advice with participation of fisheries biological and fisheries economic scientific 
experts. In the STECF Expert Groups the ICES Advice is evaluated further (see also Section 
4.3 for further details). The result of the STECF working groups is then discussed at the 
STECF plenaries, that is held three times during the year and from which the advice is 
delivered. The advice can be biological (e.g. reference points for the stock), economic (e.g. 
economic impact assessment), technical (e.g., recommended mesh sizes) or social (e.g. social 
impact assessment). Among other, Long Term Management Plans (LTMP) and Management 
Strategy Evaluation (MSE) are advised upon by ICES and STECF as described under 
Sections 6 and 8.1 of the present report. The advice takes the form of public reports available 
at the ICES web page (www.ices.dk) and on the STECF website (https://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.-
eu/web/stecf/about-stecf).  
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Scientists as the connection between science and stakeholders regarding the North Sea is seen 
at different levels, from STECF meetings to Regional Advisory Council (RAC) meetings and 
research projects (see section 4.2 and 4.3 for further details). RAC meetings also have the 
possibility of having scientists as observers. At STECF meetings a certain number of 
stakeholders are invited as observers. The communication between European Commission, 
scientists at the STECF and stakeholder representatives is also assured through transversal 
meetings throughout the year. See also section 4.3 for more details. 
 
Several European research projects include stakeholder involvement at different levels, 
including among others RAC representatives, producer organizations and fishermen. 
Examples of such projects are the EU 6th and 7th Framework Programme funded projects of 
which examples are mentioned in Section 4.2 below.  
 
 
4.2 Operational policy 
 
The EC identified the lack of stakeholder involvement as one of the major weaknesses of the 
CFP, recognizing that this fact clearly undermined its legitimacy. One of the outcomes of the 
reform of the European common fisheries policy (CFP) in 2002 was the establishment of 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) to enable the European Commission to benefit from the 
knowledge and experience of stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of fisheries 
management measures by the European institutions. RACs are now in operation for the Baltic 
Sea, the North Sea, North-Western Waters, South-Western Waters, the High-Seas/Long-
Distance Fleet, Pelagic Stocks, and the Mediterranean Sea (Long, 2010).  
 
There is a long-standing tradition in EU fisheries management for involving resource users in 
decision making (Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001). The European Commission's (EC) first step for 
involving resource users in decision-making was the introduction of the Advisory Committee 
on Fisheries (ACF) in the early 1970s. This measure was reformed in 2000, to include new 
sectors and interest groups, and the ACF was renamed the Advisory Committee on Fisheries 
and Aquaculture (ACFA). The committee has an advisory function – the Commission 
consults it on measures related to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) – and can issue 
opinions on its own initiative (Pita et al., 2010). Apart from the ACFA, a number of Europe-
wide bodies are consulted by the Commission from time to time on draft legislation and these 
include: Europêche, the EU Fish Processors’ Association, the EU Federation of National 
Organizations of Importers and Exporters of Fish, the European Association of Fish 
Producers’ Organisations, and the Federation of European Aquaculture Producers (Churchill 
and Owen in Long 2010).  
 
Although involving stakeholders in fisheries policy making is not a new phenomenon, the 
RACs can be seen as the first “formal attempt to generate a network of multi-national, multi-
interest advisory organizations with a strong regional focus” within the CFP (Sissenwine and 
Symes, 2007). The primary task of the RACs is to advise the Commission on decisions 
concerning fisheries management in respect of certain sea areas or fish stocks. The RACs are 
composed of representatives of the fishing industry and other parties concerned with the CFP, 
such as environmental organizations, aquaculture producers, consumers and recreational 
fishermen (Long, 2010). The establishment of the RACs constitute a move towards 
regionalization of fisheries policy (Pita et al., 2010), as the RAC system is primarily intended  
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to provide a regional stakeholder perspective to the Commission’s deliberations rather than 
providing stakeholders with real decision-making authorities (Hegland et al., 2012).  
 
The European commission not only seeks to involve stakeholders in policy making, but the 
EC has also stated its commitment to reconcile the expert knowledge of scientists with the 
experience of fishers, through processes that build trust and foster openness and transparency. 
The reasoning is that including fishers’ knowledge and know–how will enhance scientific 
understanding and improve the quality of data required for scientific assessments of fish 
stocks (Mackinson et al., 2011). Direct routes for stakeholder involvement in European 
research include participation in research programmes, such as the EU Joint Data Collection 
programme (DG Mare), or in specific research projects such as EFIMAS (www.efimas.org), 
JAKFISH, CEVIS, GAP, VECTORS, SOCIOEC, MYFISH, FACTS, and BENTHIS. The 
most influential European example has been the North Sea Commission Fisheries Partnership. 
This group worked closely with ICES in improving the relationship between scientists and the 
industry and initiated a number of research efforts including a survey of fishers’ perceptions 
of North Sea stocks that is still ongoing. This group was also instrumental in the formation of 
the North Sea RAC (Macksinson et al., 2011).  
 
Despite the logical connection between the CFP and expectations for involving RACs in 
research, RACs experience many difficulties that make it extremely challenging for them to 
do so. The demands for inputs on the diverse topics that directly and indirectly (e.g. wind 
farm, aggregates and oil) affect fisheries consumes the time of members, each of whom have 
many other representative hats and responsibilities. Furthermore, RACs have no budget for 
scientific advice (Mackinson et al., 2011).  
 
The regionalization aspect in advice and management is central in relation to the RACS. In 
Section 4.3.3 the North Sea RAC and the Pelagic RAC are introduced. The Pelagic RAC is 
more involved into actual management than the North Sea RAC.  
 
 
4.3 Decision-making 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Providing a schematic overview of the institutional setup underlying the governance system 
of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU) is difficult.3 It easily runs 
the risk of either creating the illusion of a simple system or further confuse what is in reality a 
quite complex system. Figure 4.3.1 is an attempt to provide a schematic overview of the 
system. The model includes the main actors in CFP governance and streams between them of 
knowledge, legal processes and policy/management interventions. 
 
Although the model in Figure 1 includes a multiplicity of actors and interactions, the model 
remains a simplified picture of the actual setting in which CFP governance unfolds. Other 
streams of interactions, as well as actors could have been added. Moreover, neither the EU 
nor the member states are unitary bodies, as it is evident from the model.  
 
                                                          
3 The following sections build on material previously presented in van Hal et al. (2010) as part of the EU funded MEFEPO 
project; where needed updated to reflect the most recent state-of-affairs. 
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The human governance system can be understood as operating on several political levels. In 
Figure 4.3.1, three levels have been included: EU supranational/intergovernmental level, EU 
regional seas level and EU member state level. However, above the EU level there is a global 
/ international level, on which the EU has signed a number of treaties, conventions and 
declarations dealing with fisheries policy and management among other issues. At the other 
end of the spectrum, there may be regional and / or local level governance considerations 
beneath the national level. Whilst this may not be particularly relevant for countries such as 
Denmark where fisheries management is highly centralised (Hegland and Raakjær 2008), in 
countries such as Spain it is necessary to consider regional / local level governance issues 
when discussing fisheries policy and management. 
 
It should be noted that one significant fishing state operating in the North Sea, namely 
Norway, is not a member of the EU. The setup for governance relating to fisheries 
management in Norway will be dealt with separately beneath. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1: The Institutional Setup for Fisheries Management in the EU. The scientific 
bodies are depicted as triangles, legal bodies as hexagons, stakeholder bodies as eclipses, and 
policy/management bodies as ‘soft’ rectangles. 
 
The CFP is the fisheries policy framework of the EU. In its present, comprehensive form, it 
covers measures relating to markets, conservation, sector structures, external relations and 
control. It was first established in 1983 (Council 1983). Conservation of living aquatic 
resources (a main pillar under the CFP) is, as one of only a handful of policy areas, under the 
exclusive competence4 of the EU. In this area it governs primarily by means of regulations 
that are binding and directly applicable at member state level. As such these legislative acts 
                                                          
4 Exclusive competence on behalf of the EU “means that the member states cannot adopt their own legislation within the 
area […] unless that power has explicitly been given back to them” (Hegland and Raakjær 2008: 164). 
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do not need to be transposed into national legislation. However, although the EU has 
exclusive competence, it is up to the member states to implement and operationalize the 
policy. The first acts relating to markets and fisheries sector structures were adopted as early 
as 1970 (Council 1970, 1970a). Since 1983, the policy has undergone reforms in 1992/93 
(Council 1992) and 2002/03 (Council 2002) and it is currently in the process of yet another 
major reform. 
 
Over the years, the primary focus of the CFP has, alongside the general development in 
fisheries management worldwide, increasingly gone from being that of ensuring efficient 
fishing fleets and well-functioning markets for fish products, towards conserving the resource 
base, which the sector ultimately stands and falls by (Gezelius et al., 2008). In practice, EU 
subsidies over the years have contributed to making the fleet more efficient, so, paradoxically; 
the success of the CFP in the area of developing an efficient fleet has contributed to its failure 
in relation to conserve fish stocks, as overcapacity is consistently mentioned as one of the 
fundamental reasons for the conservation failure. As a consequence, the focus of the policy 
has in part gone from that of developing the sector to that of conserving the stocks. 
 
In the following sections we will, with reference to Figure 4.3.1, briefly introduce the 
institutions and actors at the different levels as well as present their roles in the governance 
system. We will start at EU level and move downwards. As mentioned previously, Norway 
will be dealt with separately in section 4.3.4.3. 
 
4.3.2 EU level Institutions and Actors 
 
The formulation, adoption and implementation of EU fisheries legislation is, as it is evident 
from Figure 1 process involving a multiplicity of actors and institutions operating on various 
levels in the political system. The standard procedure of EU fisheries policy-making involves 
that a unit within the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) 
(which is the relevant directorate-general within the Commission of the European 
Communities (Commission)), drafts the envisioned piece of legislation. In this process, DG 
MARE incorporates to varying extents, depending on the nature of the proposal, input from 
stakeholders and/or scientific bodies. Once the proposal has been agreed according to the 
internal procedures of the Commission, it is forwarded to the European Parliament (EP, 
Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council), which under the ‘co-decision 
procedure’, now also called the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ that since the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty covers most fisheries issues, have joint decision-making powers (Hegland 
2004; Hegland and Raakjær 2008a): 
 
“Ordinary legislative procedure gives the same weight to the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union on a wide range of areas (for example, economic governance, 
immigration, energy, transport, the environment and consumer protection). The vast majority 
of European laws are adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council. 
 
• The Commission sends its proposal to Parliament and the Council. 
• They consider it, and discuss it on two successive occasions. 
• After two readings, if they cannot agree, the proposal is brought before a Conciliation 
Committee made up of an equal number of representatives of the Council and 
Parliament. 
• Representatives of the Commission also attend the meetings of the Conciliation 
Committee and contribute to the discussions. 
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• When the Committee has reached agreement, the text agreed upon is sent to 
Parliament and the Council for a third reading, so that they can finally adopt it as a 
legislative text. 
• The final agreement of the two institutions is essential if the text is to be adopted as a 
law. 
• Even if a joint text is agreed by the Conciliation Committee, Parliament can still reject 
the proposed law by a majority of the votes cast.” 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0080a6d3d8/Ordinary-legislative-
procedure.html, accessed 28 February 2013) 
 
Once legislation is adopted, it is passed on to the member states for implementation. Should 
disputes on the interpretation of EU fisheries legislation arise, it is ultimately up to the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities (Court; ECJ) to make a ruling (Hegland 2004; 
Hegland and Raakjær 2008a). 
 
4.3.2.1 EU Commission: 
The Commission serves as the EU bureaucracy in the area of fisheries policy as in most other 
policy areas. However, compared to a traditional, national bureaucracy, the Commission has a 
considerable degree of authority and political power vis-à-vis the decision-making bodies of 
the Council and Parliament (see sections 4.3.2.5 and 4.3.2.4). The Commission fulfils a 
number of other functions in the EU system, but in the following we will focus on the role of 
the Commission as the developer and proposer of legislation. However, as indicated in Figure 
1, other important tasks of the Commission in the area of fisheries include carrying out direct 
management (e.g. by filling out Council legislation with more detailed or technical 
legislation) and overseeing that the member states fulfil their obligations, and if they are not 
take action possibly by referring disputes to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (see section 4.3.2.7).  
 
In practice, a Commission proposal, communication, paper etc. relating to fisheries is drafted 
in the relevant office under the relevant Directorate under the Directorate General for 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE). In drafting the proposal, DG MARE takes to a 
varying extent, depending on the nature of the proposal, information from other relevant 
Directorate Generals, various committees, institutions and organisations into consideration. If 
scientific expertise is needed to draft the proposal, DG MARE is particularly dependent on 
information from other sources, as there is limited in-house scientific capacity (Commission 
2003). The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) (see sections 4.1 and 
4.3.2.8) and the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) (see 
immediately beneath) are of particular importance in these instances. The Regional Advisory 
Councils (RACs) (see sections 4.2 and 4.3.3) are now also consulted on a routine basis on 
most of the substantial initiatives from DG MARE.  
 
Once DG MARE has received the information it has deemed necessary from the various 
sources, the responsible Directorate finishes drafting the proposal and passes it upwards 
through the Commission hierarchy. Ultimately, the proposal is dealt with in the College of 
Commissioners, which consists of 27 Commissioners, each appointed by a member state. The 
Commissioners can then accept the proposal (in that case it is passed on to the European 
Parliament and the Council), reject it, refer it back for re-drafting or decide not to take any 
decision whatsoever. The Commissioners decide by simple majority voting and individual 
votes as well as results of votes are confidential (Hegland 2006).  
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4.3.2.2 Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries: 
The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) is an independent 
committee, appointed by the Commission that advises the Commission / DG MARE on 
matters where scientific knowledge is vital (see section 4.1 above for more details). The 
committee consists primarily of scientists with a background in marine biology or ecology, 
fisheries science, nature conservation, population dynamics, statistics, fishing gear 
technology, aquaculture, or the economics of fisheries and aquaculture (Commission 2005). 
STECF forms internal sub-groups, which can include experts from outside the STECF 
(Commission 2003) 
 
STECF and its sub-groups draw to a large extent on the same (limited) pool of expertise as 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, which according to the Commission 
(2003) has led to repetitive work on behalf of some of the STECF members, as one of the 
main tasks of the STECF is to review scientific advice emanating from ICES. Notably, 
besides reviewing advice and advising the Commission on its use, STECF contributes with 
economic calculations on potential effects of the predominantly biological conclusions on 
selected fleets. (EU Commission 2003; Hegland 2006) 
 
4.3.2.3 Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture: 
The Advisory Committee on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA) is a consultative body set up 
in 1971 by the Commission to provide stakeholder input from European-level stakeholder 
groups and umbrella-organisations on fisheries matters (as opposed to the RACs). The 
mandate of the committee is to issue opinions and resolutions on fisheries issues and 
proposals emanating from the Commission (see also section 4.2 above). 
 
ACFA was reorganised in 1999 and 2004, and according to Lequesne (2000), the actual 
impact of ACFA on Commission proposals has over the years been limited. Consequently, he 
argues, "[t]he core raison d'être of the Consultative Committee [ACFA] has been an exercise 
in mutual legitimization” (Lequesne 2000: 353). 
 
4.3.2.4 European Parliament: 
The European Parliament (EP, Parliament), which consists of democratically elected 
parliamentarians from the 27 member states, has decision-making powers jointly with the 
Council under the co-decision procedure / ordinary legislative procedure, as further described 
above in Section 4.3.2.  
 
Most of the work on fisheries legislation is carried out in the standing Committee on 
Fisheries, which, after having discussed the issues based on a report drafted by one of its 
members, adopts a proposal for a resolution by a simple majority. This proposal for a 
resolution is subsequently dealt with by the Parliament in plenary, where each proposed 
amendment has to gather a majority of present parliamentarians. (Hegland 2004; 2006) 
 
4.3.2.5 Council of the European Union: 
In the Council of the European Union (Council), the member states are each represented by 
their minister responsible for fisheries issues. These ministers meet in the Agriculture and 
Fisheries Council, which acts as the primary decision-making body in relation to the CFP.  
 
Fisheries policy issues in the Council are subject to qualified majority voting (QMV), which 
means that no single member state is in a position to block a proposal. The member states 
hold different numbers votes in the Council; the largest member states have most votes but 
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the smaller member states have more votes than the size of their populations would strictly 
suggest. The question of how often a member state finds itself in the favourable position to 
decide if a proposal is adopted or not depends, consequently, on its size (number of votes and 
size of population), and on the prevailing coalition patterns within the Council.  
 
In practice, it is only a limited number of fisheries issues that actually reach the level of 
ministers. The Council is a hierarchical structure where proposals are initially scrutinised by 
member states’ civil servants in lower level working groups. The least contentious issues can 
be negotiated at this level. Questions of a more contentious nature are passed on upwards to 
the higher ranking civil servants in the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper). 
Only the most politically sensitive issues are discussed in substance and subsequently decided 
on by the ministers in the Council. 
 
Although there is, as described above, a voting arrangement in the Council, networking and 
informal contacts and communication remain extremely important in Council negotiation 
processes on fisheries issues. The informal communication serves multiple purposes, e.g. 
leaking one’s own and getting other countries’ positions in order to explore possible 
compromises or gaining a better understanding of other member states’ underlying motives 
(Hegland 2004). 
 
4.3.2.6 Community Fisheries Control Agency:  
The recent establishment5 of the independent Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) 
is an integral element in the progressive implementation of the previous 2002/03 reform of the 
fisheries policy framework, and the objective of the CFCA is to strengthen the uniformity and 
effectiveness of enforcement across the EU territory. This should be done by assisting with 
the organisation of operational cooperation and coordination of monitoring and enforcement 
activities among member states (Council 2005). 
 
The powers of the CFCA are highly limited, and it is specifically stated in its legal foundation 
that the agency does not have the power to impose additional obligations on the member 
states besides those outlined in the basic regulation of the CFP. Neither does the agency have 
any powers to sanction member states (Council 2005). In practice, the main task of the CFCA 
is to adopt ‘joint deployment plans’ (for specific stocks in specific sea areas) with the aim of 
coordinating the use of the different member states’ human and material resources related to 
control and inspection as well as solving issues related to how and when control and 
enforcement activities of one member state may take place in waters under the sovereignty 
and jurisdiction of another member state, among other things. The relevant RACs should be 
involved in developing the plan (Council 2005, Community Fisheries Control Agency 
Undated).  
 
4.3.2.7 Court of Justice of the European Communities: 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ, Court) is the legal body mandated to 
rule in disputes on the interpretation of EU law (including fisheries legislation) and thereby 
settle disputes between citizens and member states, between member states and EU 
institutions, as well as between EU institutions or between member states etc. In principle, the 
Court is a neutral actor in the governance system. However, as briefly mentioned in Hegland 
(2004), the Court has in some instances been accused of having engaged in ‘judicial activism’ 
to favour increased integration. 
                                                          
5 Operational from 2007 in Brussels and physically set up in Vigo, Spain, in 2008. 
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4.3.2.8 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea6:  
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is an international scientific 
organisation covering the North East Atlantic and is the predominant source of scientific input 
to the decision-making process relating to the CFP. The science is almost exclusively 
biological, and mainly in the form of stock assessments, which are essentially statistical 
interpretation of sampling programmes (see section 4.1 above for more details). However, it is 
important to note that ICES is not an EU institution and that ICES delivers advice to a range 
of clients besides the EU. Nevertheless, the EU is its largest client.  
 
ICES’ advice is based on data provided by national scientific institutes in either the shape of 
fisheries-independent data (e.g. from trawl surveys carried out by research vessels) or 
fisheries-dependent data (e.g. catch statistics from commercial vessels). Within the ICES 
system, the data from the various sources are analysed in a large system of working and study 
groups and turned into scientific advice for ICES clients’. Their clients include governments 
and international organisations with marine management responsibilities of which the EU is 
the single largest.  
 
4.3.3 The Regional Seas level: The Regional Advisory Councils 
 
Seven Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) were set up under the CFP following the 2002 
reform (see also section 4.2 above). These are stakeholder fora consisting of representatives of 
the fisheries sector (ideally 2/3 of the membership), defined as "the catching sub-sector, 
including shipowners, small-scale fishermen, employed fishermen, producer organisations as 
well as, amongst others, processors, traders and other market organisations and women's 
networks" (Council 2004: art. 1), as well as a smaller group (ideally 1/3) of representatives of 
other interest groups, including "amongst others, environmental organisations and groups, 
aquaculture producers, consumers and recreational or sport fishermen" (Council 2004: art. 
1). Other than the members, a number of people can be involved either as experts or active 
observers. These include Commission representatives, member state representatives, 
scientists, representatives from third countries etc. The RACs are primarily meant to function 
as advisory bodies towards the Commission but member states can also draw on the RACs for 
resolutions. The RACs are also mandated to issue resolutions on their own initiative (Council 
2002). The Commission (or the member state authorities) is not obliged to follow a 
recommendation from a RAC and, therefore, in practice the advantage of following a 
recommendation from the RAC will always be weighed against other preferences of those 
receiving the recommendation.  
 
The RACs are either organised along specific sea areas roughly corresponding to large marine 
ecosystems / regional seas (five RACs7) or specific types of fisheries (two RACs8) (Council 
2004) (Figure 4.3.2). It is noteworthy that the introduction of RACs introduced a new political 
level in EU fisheries management which meant there was, for the first time, a close one-to-
one match between a level of management in the governance system and a biological, 
ecological scale in the natural system (see Figure 4.3.1). Each RAC consists of a General 
Assembly (GA) and an Executive Committee (ExCom). However, in practice most of the 
work on the resolutions is done in a number of specific working groups set up under each 
RAC. It is the ExCom that adopts recommendations, as far as possible, by consensus. 
However, if it is not possible to arrive at a compromise that is acceptable to all, then decisions 
                                                          
6 This section builds in part on information from the ICES website: http://www.ices.dk/ (accessed 28 February 2013). 
7 Baltic Sea RAC, North Sea RAC, South Western Waters RAC, North Western Waters RAC and Mediterranean RAC. 
8 Pelagic RAC and Distant Waters RAC. 
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can be taken by a majority vote but dissenting opinions should then be recorded in the 
resolution (Council 2004). However, it is clear that generally consensus resolutions have 
considerably more political clout in the decision-making process than resolutions including 
dissenting opinions; particularly if a broad selection of RAC members both from the sector 
and other interests has been active in the process of drafting the resolution. 
 
Two RACs are operating in the North Sea, namely the North Sea RAC and the Pelagic RAC. 
The North Sea RAC was as the first RAC declared operational in 2004 and covers ICES area 
IV and sub-area IIIa. The Pelagic RAC became operational in 2005 and deals with issues 
related to four pelagic species in all EU waters: blue whiting, horse mackerel, mackerel and 
herring. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2: The Regional Advisory Councils. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/partners/regional_advisory_councils/rac_en.pdf, accessed 21 
October 2011) 
 
4.3.4 The Member State Level 
 
Aside from Norway, the European countries of relevance in the North Sea are all EU member 
states. This means, as described earlier, that they are subject to the CFP framework. In the 
following section we will provide a brief understanding of the role and responsibilities of the 
member states in the EU governance system.  
 
4.3.4.1 The Role of the EU Member States in the CFP Governance System: 
Although the conservation of resources is a fundamental pillar of the CFP, and under the 
exclusive competence of the EU, this does not mean that member states are powerless to 
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protect marine resources. Importantly, the member states occupy a central role in the decision-
making process through their membership of the Council. Though the Commission is also a 
powerful actor at the EU level, it is ultimately the member states themselves that adopt the 
legislation of the CFP together with the Parliament.  
 
Moreover, it is the member states that are tasked with implementing CFP legislation 
nationally, although most of the legislation under the CFP is adopted in the shape of 
regulations that are directly binding on the member states. The power of implementation does 
allow the member states to take national considerations into account. As discussed in Gezelius 
et al. (2008), the Commission is only to a limited degree able to control and sanction member 
states that take these national considerations too far and engage in implementation practices 
that are problematic as seen from central EU perspective. This is particularly the case when 
unsustainable implementation practices are not outright against the rules but rather against the 
‘spirit of the rules’. 
 
How the national institutional setup for fisheries management looks like in practice differs 
from member state to member state; something we will look more at in the following section. 
However, in Figure 4.3.1 above we have outlined the basic elements of any national system: 
1) Political institutions to legislate in the areas where the member states themselves are in 
charge, e.g. allocation of fishing rights. 2) Managerial institutions tasked with executing the 
decisions of the political system including the EU. 3) Stakeholders, often predominantly from 
industry but increasingly from conservationist NGOs, offering advice both to managers and 
politicians either through formal or informal channels. 4) National research and advisory 
institutes that monitor the state of fish stocks (as well as carry out other research activities 
related to fish and fisheries) and feed data and experts into ICES and STECF. Besides the 
institutions depicted in the figure, there is also a national legal system. And as mentioned 
earlier, if the state has delegated responsibilities to regional governments then the picture gets 
more complicated. 
 
4.3.4.2 Bilateral Cooperation between Member States: 
It is possible for member states to decide fisheries management measures jointly on a bilateral 
basis. However, the measures have to respect the CFP regulations and it is not possible to 
make the regulations binding on other member states’ vessels than those making the 
agreement. 
A recent example of such cooperation is the agreements made between Denmark and Sweden 
on closing or restricting fishing activities in certain areas in Kattegat from 2009 to protect the 
cod stock. In total three areas are established. Two have certain restrictions on fishing and one 
area is completely closed. 
A decision-making problem in relation to this has been that the closure has not been taken on-
board by the EU system and therefore a few German vessels have been able to continue to 
exercise their fishing rights in the area, which has clearly limited the legitimacy of the 
bilateral agreement. The legality of this bilateral procedure is highly contested by the 
industries in Sweden and Denmark, who have seen their fishing possibilities reduced as a 
result. 
 
4.3.4.3 Norway: 
Except for the supra-national level which the EU-authorities constitute, the Norwegian 
institutional set-up very much resembles that of the EU member states (see Figure 4.3.1). The 
highest authority in Norway is the Ministry for Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, which is 
responsible for issuing laws and regulations. The executive administrative body is the 
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Directorate of Fisheries, which is a decentralised authority consisting of seven regional 
offices spread along the coast, in addition to the main office.       
 
Norway works through two channels in order to influence the management of commercially 
important straddling stocks, which they share with other countries (Ministry of Fisheries and 
Coastal Affairs 2008):   
 
1) Bi- and multilateral agreements with other countries about quotas on specified shared 
stocks in international waters and specification of access to quotas in the economic 
zones of other countries and vice versa.  
2) Participation in international organisations regulating fishing activities in international 
waters.   
 
The agreements are renegotiated annually, and the most important bilateral agreements 
Norway has are with the EU, Russia, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. The agreement with 
the EU is a framework agreement, entered into in 1978. The agreement is based on a mutual 
understanding of common responsibility for the management of stocks in the North Sea, and a 
mutual access to fisheries within the economic zones of the countries. The Norwegian and EU 
quotas in the North Sea, the Norwegian fisheries west of the British Islands and the EU 
fisheries in the Norwegian economic zone in the Barents Sea are negotiated annually.   
 
4.3.5 Characteristics of the Common Fisheries Policy Governance System 
 
The CFP can in many ways be argued to take the form of a classical intergovernmentalist, 
state-centric command-and-control, top-down management system, where member states’ 
ministers in the Council exercise strong control over the fisheries management measures, 
which are developed and adopted9 on the background of proposals from the Commission. 
This has, however, changed somewhat with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which has 
provided the European Parliament with a stronger position. The member states are responsible 
for the implementation of the rules and for monitoring compliance in relation to fishing 
activities taking place in waters under their jurisdiction, and they report back to the 
Commission, which is among other issues tasked with “making sure that CFP rules are 
effectively implemented and that Member States set up and apply appropriate systems and 
rules to manage, control and enforce the limitations on fishing possibilities and fishing effort 
required by the CFP” (DG MARE 2008).  
 
4.3.5.1 Implementation Drift: 
Though situated at the top of the top-down structure together with the Council and the 
Parliament, the Commission has very weak powers in relation to direct control and 
monitoring of fishing activities compared to the member states. Gezelius et al. (2008) analyse 
with outset in the principal-agent approach the relationship between the EU (in that analysis 
treated as principal) and the member states (in that analysis treated as multiple agents) and 
document how the EU, represented by the Commission, is on crucial points in a weak position 
vis-à-vis the member states. One of the key findings of the analysis is the apparent inability of 
the EU to sanction member states whose implementation practices conflict with the intention  
  
                                                          
9 If necessary by means of qualified majority vote (QMV). 
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of the rules or the with overall political goals but are not directly against the rules (in 
principal-agent terminology this can be referred to as non-criminal agency drift).10 Usually 
non-criminal agency drift can be moderated by amending the framework that the agents 
operate under to change the incentive structure or make rules less open to interpretation. 
However, this has often not been possible under the CFP, which to a wide extent rests on 
sticky historical compromises. Moreover, the member states in the Council tend to be aligned 
in semi-permanent groups, each able to produce a blocking minority (Hegland 2004 and 
Raakjær 2008). Another key finding relates to the fact that the Commission largely relies on 
the member states themselves in the process of monitoring and overseeing their management 
efforts (although conservation NGOs can and do function as watchdogs). The Commission 
does not have the institutional capacity or legal mandate to genuinely monitor the member 
states and the member states in the Council are traditionally reluctant to transfer ‘police-like’ 
authorities to the Commission. Consequently, Gezelius et al. (2008: 217) conclude that “it is 
hard to escape the fact that what seems to characterise the CFP from a principal-agent 
perspective seems to be strong incentives for the agents to drift away from conservation and 
weak powers on behalf of the principal to prevent this”. 
 
4.3.5.2 A Stronger Commitment to Science: 
Although the decision-makers under the CFP have had a reputation of consistently setting 
TACs way above the scientific advice, the development in recent years has been towards this 
gap being reduced. The explanation for this is multi-facetted. One part of the explanation is 
that eNGOs have increasingly mobilised and organised vis-à-vis the CFP. Another 
explanation is the incremental shift towards managing stocks by means of harvest control 
rules (HCR). Moreover, the spread of certification schemes, in particular MSC, has changed 
the way the fishing industry view quota setting by putting a premium on not setting quotas too 
high. All these developments together have created a climate in which the pressure for 
inflated TACs is lower than in previous years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 One example could be that for the most fundamental conservation measures under the CFP, the TACs and quotas, there 
are few incentives for the member states to catch their quotas in a conservationist manner, i.e. reduce discards (fish 
thrown back dead or dying in the sea because they are too small or the vessel does not have a quota for them), at least if 
the stocks in question are shared with other member states. Whereas the benefits of being able to fish even with high 
discard rates are reaped by the individual member state, the negative impact of the non-conservationist behaviour is 
shared among all the member states, who will receive lower quotas in the following year. This is a telling example of the 
“tragedy of the commons” dynamic (Hardin 1968).  
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5. Management objectives and principles 
 
5.1 FAO Code of Conduct and EU CFP Objectives 
 
The highest level objectives regarding fisheries can be found in the FAO Code of Conduct 
(FAO 1995), which states: “Fisheries management should promote the maintenance of the 
quality, diversity and availability of fishery resources in sufficient quantities for present and 
future generations in the context of food security, poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development”.  
 
Overall in Europe, the objective for fisheries management is expressed in the proposal for a 
basic regulation as “The CFP shall ensure that fishing and aquaculture activities provide long-
term sustainable environmental, economic and social conditions and contribute to the 
availability of food supplies.” The proposal further mentions the precautionary approach and 
ecosystem based management as guiding principles for fisheries management. Another 
relevant regulation is the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), agreed on between 
the European Parliament and the European Commission in December 2007. The main 
objectives are stated in article 1.3 as being “enabling the sustainable use of marine goods and 
services by present and future generations”. This will be achieved by establishing marine 
regions and sub-regions, which will be managed by member states in an integrated manner 
based on environmental criteria. With respect to neighbouring countries, the EU has a 
framework agreement with Norway, with an objective to “ensure proper management and 
conservation of the living resources of the sea” 
 
In practice, these European objectives materialize in the prevailing management system, 
whose fundamental instrument has been landing quotas (TAC, Total Allowable Catch) mainly 
based on the EU principle of relative stability in the international sharing of the TAC. Also, 
general effort and technical measures are set for the EU and Norwegian fisheries in relation to 
the principles of obtaining sustainable fish stocks under fisheries management.  
 
5.2 Regional objectives 
 
Focusing closer on regional objectives covering the North Sea, the North Sea Regional 
Advisory Council (NSRAC) declares its aim to be “to work towards integrated and 
sustainable management of fisheries in the wider context of the sustainability of the marine 
environment”. Furthermore, the NSRAC considers the concepts of sustainability, ecosystem 
approach and precautionary principle within its objectives. However, it should be recalled that 
the NSRAC holds no deceision.making powers (see section 4.2 and 4.3.3). In the case of 
specific management plans referring to the North sea, the cod long term management plan 
states as its objective to “ensure the sustainable exploitation of the cod stocks on the basis of 
maximum sustainable yield” Management of the demersal roundfish and flatfish fisheries in 
the North Sea is conducted mainly through the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP 1983, 
1993, 2003, 2013) and the yearly EU-Norway Bilateral Fishery Agreements 
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5.3 National objectives 
 
In relation to specific national management objectives, some nations have expressed the CFP 
objectives even more firmly. For instance, one of the objectives in the Danish national 
management system was to address how to obtain the highest economic outcome from the 
allocated quotas. In Denmark, beside reference to the CFP, the Ministry highlights that it 
works on securing a sustainable and development-oriented fisheries industry, creating flexible 
framework conditions for the industry, as well as reducing the administrative burdens placed 
on the fisheries industry. For other countries, as Germany, the objective of the fisheries policy 
of the Federal Ministry for Nutrition, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection is to manage the 
stocks sustainably, to fight illegal fishing effectively and a proper labelling for consumers. In 
the Netherlands the Ministry of Economic Affairs aims to stimulate a responsible fisheries, a 
sustainable exploitation of fish stocks, and a balance between fisheries and nature 
conservation. The Ministry is responsible for the main tasks, but delegates tasks to the 
industry (co-management), and tries to improve cooperation within the fisheries value chain. 
Moreover, fisheries policy needs to be embedded in broader policy themes such as the 
regional policy, and international water policy. The Dutch government also stimulates 
(through subsidies) fishing companies to develop sustainable fishing methods  
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6.   Management strategies 
 
Long term management plans for the central stocks involved in the mixed demersal North Sea 
consume fisheries area summarised below. This is done according to management targets 
under the MSY-approach (Maximum Sustainable Yield) and PA-Approach (Precautionary 
Approach), i.e. management reference limits and harvest control rules associated hereto.   
 
Cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and Eastern Channel: 
The EU–Norway agreement management plan was updated in December 2008, and re-
considered in 2012. The EU has adopted a long-term plan for this stock with the same aims 
(EC, 2008: Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008). ICES evaluated the plans in 2009 and 
concluded that they are both in accordance with the precautionary approach if implemented 
and enforced adequately.  
 
Haddock in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
In 2008 the EU and Norway agreed a revised management plan for this stock (EC, 2008), 
which states that every effort will be made to maintain a minimum level of SSB greater than 
100 000 t (Blim). Furthermore, fishing was restricted on the basis of a TAC consistent with a 
fishing mortality rate of no more than 0.30 for appropriate age groups, along with a limitation 
on interannual TAC variability of ±15%. Following a minor revision in 2008, interannual 
quota flexibility (“banking and borrowing”) of up to ±10% is permitted (although this facility 
has not yet been used). The stipulations of the management plan have been adhered to by the 
EU and Norway since its implementation in January 2007. ICES has evaluated the manage-
ment plan from 2008 and concludes that it can be accepted as precautionary (ICES, 2012a). 
In 2012, ICES puts forward mixed-fisheries advice for the first time (ICES, 2012b). In 
contrast to single-species advice there is no single recommendation but a range of plausible 
scenarios, assuming fishing patterns and catchability in 2012 and 2013 unchanged from those 
in 2011. Major differences between the outcomes of the various scenarios indicate potential 
undershoot or overshoot of the TACs corresponding to the single-species advice. As a result, 
fleet dynamics may change, but cannot be determined. 
In 2013, cod is the limiting species for all the North Sea demersal fisheries. Following the 
‘cod’ scenario (full implementation of the cod management plan), the haddock management 
plan catch options could not be fully utilized. 
Within an ecosystem context, species-specific assessments and the latest developments in 
mixed-fisheries approaches need to be considered. A reduction in direct effort on one stock 
may lead to a reduction or an increase in effort on another and, hence, the implications of any 
changes need to be identified and carefully evaluated. 
 
Whiting in the North Sea and the Eastern Channel: 
The response to the Joint EU–Norway request on the management of whiting in Subarea IV 
(North Sea) and Division VIId (Eastern Channel) from ICES in September 2010 stated that 
“maintaining fishing mortality at its current level of 0.3 would be consistent with long-term 
stability if recruitment is not poor” for several consecutive years (ICES, 2012a; www.ices.dk). 
Consequently the EU and Norway have agreed to interim management of whiting at this level 
of total fishing mortality for 2011, conditional on a ±15% TAC constraint. ICES assumes that 
this approach is still in place.  
Following this management plan in 2013 implies a fishing mortality of 0.3, which would 
increase the TAC by more than 15%. Applying the TAC constraint would lead to human 
consumption landings of no more than 19 614 t for the North Sea. Although not covered by 
the management plan, this option would lead to low landings in Division VIId.  
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After the considerable revisions in this year’s assessment in the level of fishing mortality in 
2012, caused by new estimates of natural mortality, the target F is no longer considered 
applicable and the management target needs re-evaluation. 
 
Saithe in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
The EU–Norway agreed management plan as updated in December 2008 (see under cod, 
haddock and whiting), which ICES in 2008 has evaluated and considered to be consistent 
with the precautionary approach in the short term. 
 
Plaice in the North Sea: 
A multiannual plan for plaice and sole in the North Sea was adopted by the EU Council in 
2007 (EC regulation 676/2007) which describes two stages: to be deemed a recovery plan 
during its first stage and a management plan during its second stage. Objectives are defined 
for these two stages; to rebuild the stocks to within safe biological limits and to exploit the 
stocks at MSY respectively. Stage 1 is deemed to be completed when both stocks have been 
within safe biological limits for two consecutive years. TAC setting procedures are provided 
to accommodate stage 1 as well as a transitional period during which an Impact Assessment 
should take place to reconsider long term objectives. The management plan prescribes effort 
limitations (kW-days per metier) to be adjusted in line with changes in fishing mortality. The 
current advice implies a reduction of 10% in effort (following a 10% reduction in F for sole). 
 
Sole in the North Sea: 
A multiannual plan for plaice and sole in the North Sea was adopted by the EU Council in 
2007 (EC regulation 676/2007) – see above under plaice. The current plan prescribes effort 
limitations (kW-days per metier) to be adjusted in line with changes in fishing mortality. The 
current advice implies a reduction of 10% in effort (following a 10% reduction in F to 0.27 
for sole). 
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7.   Management tools 
 
7.1 Conservation measures 
 
7.1.1 MSY based TACs and F levels (ICES, 2012a; www.ices.dk):  
 
Cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel: 
The EU–Norway agreement management plan as updated in December 2008 (EC, 2008) aims 
to be consistent with the precautionary approach and is intended to provide for sustainable 
fisheries and high yield, leading to a target fishing mortality of 0.4. The EU has adopted a 
long-term plan for this stock with the same aims (Council Regulation (EC) 1342/2008). In 
addition to the EU–Norway agreement, the EU plan also includes effort restrictions, reducing 
kW-days available to community vessels in the main metiers catching cod in direct proportion 
to reductions in fishing mortality until the long-term phase of the plan is reached, for which 
the target F is 0.4 if SSB is above Bpa. Following the management plan implies a reduction in 
effort ceilings of 18.2% in 2012 and 22.2% in 2013, compared to the preceding year. In both 
plans, fishing mortality should be reduced to levels corresponding to 75% of F2008 in 2009 and 
65% of F2008 in 2010. Until the long-term phase of the management plans has been reached, 
further annual reductions of 10% must be applied to achieve an F in 2013 equal to 35% of 
F2008. This would lead to a TAC reduction of more than 20%. The management plans limit 
annual TAC variations to 20%. According to these rules, landings should be no more than 
25 441 t in total for Subarea IV and Divisions IIIa West and VIId in 2013. 
 
Haddock in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
In 2008 the EU and Norway agreed a revised management plan for this stock (EC, 2008), 
which states that every effort will be made to maintain a minimum level of SSB greater than 
100 000 t (Blim). Furthermore, fishing was restricted on the basis of a TAC consistent with a 
fishing mortality rate of no more than 0.30 for appropriate age groups, along with a limitation 
on interannual TAC variability of ±15%. 
 
Whiting in the North Sea and Eastern Channel: 
Following this management plan in 2013 implies a fishing mortality of 0.3, which would 
increase the TAC by more than 15%. Applying the TAC constraint would lead to human 
consumption landings of no more than 19 kt for the North Sea. Although not covered by the 
management plan, this option would lead to landings in Division VIId of no more than 7 kt. 
 
Saithe in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
SSB has been above Bpa since 1997 but has declined since 2005 towards Bpa. Fishing 
mortality has fluctuated around FMSY since 1997. Recruitment has been below average since 
2006. The EU–Norway agreement management plan does not clearly state whether the SSB in 
the intermediate year or the SSB at the beginning or end of the TAC year should be used to 
determine the status of the stock. ICES interprets this as being the SSB at the beginning of the 
intermediate year (2012). Since SSB at the beginning of 2012 is above Bpa, and a F = 0.3 will 
give a larger change than 15%, paragraph 5 of the harvest control rule applies, resulting in a 
TAC of 100 684 t and an SSB in 2014 of 252 000 t. Following the ICES MSY framework 
implies a fishing mortality of FMSY = 0.3. This would result in landings of no more than 113 
100 t in 2013 and an SSB in 2014 of 241 000 t. According to the precautionary approach 
fishing at Fpa = 0.4 results in landings of less than 143 000 t in 2013 and a SSB of 214 000 in 
2014. 
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Plaice in the North Sea: 
Following the EU multiannual plan (Council Regulation (EC) No. 676/2007) would imply a 
TAC of 97 070 t (F=0.27) for Subarea IV in 2013, which is a 15% increase in comparison to 
2012, complying to the constraint of 15% TAC change of the plan. This is expected to lead to 
an SSB of 665 000 t in 2014. Both the North Sea plaice and sole stocks have been within safe 
biological limits in the last two years. FMSY has been set to 0.25 based on simulation studies 
and equilibrium analyses, taking into account a number of stock–recruitment relationships 
that generated a range of values between 0.2 and 0.3. 
 
Sole in the North Sea: 
SSB has fluctuated around the precautionary reference points for the last decade and is 
estimated to be above Bpa in 2012. Fishing mortality has shown a declining trend since 1995 
and is estimated to be between FMSY and Fpa since 2008. Following the EU multiannual 
plan would imply a 10% reduction of F to 0.27, resulting in a TAC of 14 000 t in 2013 (an 
exact 15% reduction in comparison to 2012, without applying the 15% TAC change bounds 
of the plan) and implying a 10% reduction in fishing effort. This is expected to lead to an SSB 
of 49 000 t in 2014. ICES has evaluated this management plan and considers it to be 
precautionary. Following the ICES MSY framework implies fishing mortality to be reduced 
to 0.22 (FMSY, as SSB 2012 > MSY Btrigger), resulting in landings of less than 12 000 t in 
2013. This is expected to lead to an SSB of 51 000 t in 2014.Following the transition scheme 
towards the ICES MSY framework implies fishing mortality to be reduced to 0.27 ((0.36 
*0.4) + (0.22 *0.6)), which will result in landings of less than 14 000 t in 2013. This is 
expected to lead to an SSB of 48 000 t in 2014. The precautionary Fpa for North Sea sole is 
0.4. This would lead to landings of 19 000 t in 2013 and an SSB of 41 000 t in 2014. 
 
7.1.2 Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) and Vessel quota share (FKA) measures 
 
Furthermore, the management is based on a set of national measures especially concerning 
control and enforcement measures, national distribution of the overall TAC, individual special 
technical measures, allocation (distribution) of national TACs to different fisheries and 
vessels including the share to e.g. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) or vessel quota 
shares (VQSs). For example, the structure of the Danish fishing fleet has changed 
considerably since 2003, where the first ITQ regulation was implemented in the herring 
fishery. Since then, ITQs has gradually been introduced in other pelagic fisheries, and from 
2007 demersal fisheries were also managed with individual and transferable Vessel Quota 
Shares (VQS). The VQS were given to the fishermen free of charge (i.e. the grandfathering 
method), and each vessel was allocated a share based on their landings in the reference period 
2003-2005. These measures have been undertaken in order to reduce overcapacity in the 
Danish fishery and to increase the economic performance of the Danish fleets. (See also 
Section 7.2 for more details). 
 
7.1.3 Effort measures  
 
Effort restrictions in the EC were introduced in 2003 (annual annexes to the TAC regulations) 
for the protection of the North Sea cod stock. In 2009, the management programme switched 
from a days-at-sea to a kW-day system (EC, 2009, 2009 Council Regulation (EC) 
N°43/2009), in which different amounts of kW-days are allocated within each area by 
member state to different groups of vessels depending on gear and mesh size. Effort ceilings 
are updated annually.  
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Overall nominal effort (kW-days) by European demersal trawls, seines, beam trawls, and 
gillnets in the North Sea, Skagerrak, and Eastern Channel had been substantially reduced 
(−20% between 2003 and 2011). Following the introduction of days-at-sea regulations in 
2003, there was a substantial switch from the larger mesh (>100 mm, TR1) gear to the smaller 
mesh (70–99 mm, TR2) gear. Subsequently, effort by TR1 has been relatively stable, whereas 
effort in TR2, beam trawl (80–120 mm, BT2), and gillnet has shown a continuous decline 
(−12%, −39%, and −35%, respectively, between 2004 and 2011). Nominal effort reported by 
Norway has increased in 2011 after the generalization of electronic logbooks (ICES, 
2012a,b).  
 
7.1.4 Technical measures including closures 
 
Technical measures have been largely introduced to reduce the retention and discarding of 
juveniles of commercial and non-commercial species and to improve species selective 
characteristics of fishing gears. The history of technical measures in EU waters and also in 
non-EU waters is one of numerous regulations, amendments, implementing rules and 
temporary technical measures introduced into the annual Fishing Opportunities (TAC and 
Quota) Regulations as a stop-gap. All told across all the different sea basins, including non-
EU waters, since 1980 no less than 90 different technical measures regulations or regulations 
containing technical measures have been enacted by the EU.  
 
The first technical measures regulation for EU fisheries in the Northeast Atlantic and the 
North Sea was introduced in 1980, and contained definitions of areas, mesh size and catch 
composition regulations, minimum landing sizes, prohibitions on certain gears, closed 
area/seasons and gear restrictions as well as the legal basis for the establishment of emergency 
measures (STECFWG on technical measures, 2012). (See examples below of closures in the 
North Sea). 
 
The minimum trawl mesh size for e.g. cod, haddock, whiting mixed fisheries was increased to 
120 mm in the northern area of the North Sea in 2002 and this may have contributed to the 
substantial decrease in landings of whiting. Plaice is predominantly caught by beam trawlers 
in the central part of the North Sea with a minimum mesh size of 100–120 mm depending on 
area. A mixed fishery with sole in the southern North Sea takes place with a minimum mesh 
size of 80 mm.  
 
Scotland implemented in February 2008 a national scheme known as the ‘Conservation 
Credits Scheme’. The principle of this scheme involves additional time at sea in return for the 
adoption of measures which aim to reduce mortality on cod and lead to a reduction in discard 
numbers. In particular, a pillar of this scheme is the instigation of Real-Time-Closures (RTCs) 
intended to divert demersal fishing effort away from areas of abundant cod, and hence to 
reduce cod mortality (Needle and Catarino, 2011). The RTCs were initially stipulated as areas 
of ∼50 square nautical miles and were initially defined as 7 × 7 nautical mile squares, 
although this limitation has subsequently been relaxed and RTCs may now be of different 
shapes. Since June 2010, the maximum possible area of each RTC has been increased to 225 
square nautical miles. Each RTC is in place for 21 days, following which period they are 
reopened automatically. Further, the rules limit the number of RTCs that can be enacted 
simultaneously in proximity to prevent certain local fishing communities being unfairly 
disadvantaged. There were 165 closures in 2010, and 185 in 2011. 
The closure of an area is triggered by an upper limit on the observed cod density, defined as 
40 cod (of any size) per hour's fishing. Notification is via skipper's logbooks, monitored 
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landings, or by on-board observation, and a single high-density haul is sufficient to instigate a 
closure. There may only be a maximum of 11 closures defined by logbook or landings data in 
operation at any one time, along with an additional three closures defined by positive on-
board samples. Since 2009, observance of RTCs by Scottish demersal fishing vessels has 
been mandatory. There is no legal impediment to vessels from other countries fishing in 
RTCs, although they have been encouraged by the Scottish Government and the EU not to do 
so, and anecdotal evidence from compliance officers and the Scottish fishing industry 
suggests that RTCs have generally been respected by non-Scottish vessels. Analyses 
conducted by Holmes et al., (2011) and Needle and Catarino (2011) have both showed that 
Real-Time closures have had some positive effects on reducing cod catches, and compliance 
with the closure elements of the scheme was judged to have been good. However, the overall 
effects on the stock dynamics and total fishing mortality are difficult to estimate. The effects 
of this regulation on the behaviour of the fleet and on the haddock stock are still unclear. 
 
The expansion of the closed-circuit TV (CCTV) and fully documented fisheries (FDF) 
programmes in 2010–2012 in Scotland, Denmark, and England is expected to have 
contributed to the reduction of cod mortality. Under this scheme, UK vessels are not 
permitted to discard any cod, while Danish vessels are still permitted to discard undersize cod. 
For both nations, all cod caught are counted against the quota. Vessels carrying CCTV 
systems may preferentially target haddock to prevent exhausting the cod quota and having to 
tie up. 
 
An example of of a closure in the North Sea is the Plaice Box11:  
The Plaice Box (PB) is a special management measure in the North Sea. It was established as 
a technical fisheries management measure to protect undersized plaice from discarding, 
closing the area for trawl fisheries with vessels >221kW, with the expectation that yield and 
spawning stock biomass would increase (see Fig. 7.1.1).  
For vessels <221 kW this meant less competition from larger vessels on the fishing grounds. 
The main objective of the PB, the increasing biomass of plaice due to conservation of 
undersized fishes, was not achieved as plaice biomass decreased substantially after the 
introduction. The reasons for that are not totally clear.  
The main question is whether the decrease in the plaice stock is due to the establishment of 
the PB or due to a change in the environment unrelated to the establishment of the PB (ocean 
climate, eutrophication, others). The effort decreased in the box, especially of vessels also 
targeting finfish. The smaller vessels have more or less the same fishing effort targeting 
shrimps and some vessels also fishing on flatfish species (see Table 7.1.1).  
The discarding of plaice mainly occurs in the fishery for brown shrimps (beam trawl 16-32 
mm), sole (beam trawl 80 mm) and the 80 mm otter trawl fishery. As the PB is not as 
effective as it was expected at the time of introduction and the plaice and sole stocks are 
increasing and now fished nearly on the level of MSY, a discussion may start if the Box can 
be opened up again for larger vessels.  
In relation to the Plaice Box, the spatial distribution of juvenile and adult sole remains 
constant, following the removal of a large amount of effort. The proportion of undersized sole 
(<24 cm) did not change after closure and remained stable at a level of 60–70%. Different 
length groups showed different patterns in abundance. Sole of around 5 cm showed a decrease 
in abundance from 2000 onwards, while the groups of 10 and 15 cm seemed rather stable. The 
largest groups showed a declining trend in abundance, which had already set in years before 
the closure. 
                                                          
11 This section is mainly based on the EU funded study ‚Revision of the plaice box’ by Beare et al. 2010.  
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Fig. 7.1.1: Plaice Box (Beare et al. 2010: 35) 
 
 
Table 7.1.1: Percentages of effort, catch and earnings inside the PB of total (in and outside the 
PB) effort, catch and earnings for small (<221 kW) and large (>221 kW) vessels (mean of the 
year 2005 to 2008 for all countries combined , calculated VMS data (Beare et al. 2010: 6) 
 
 
 
There are also recently implemented real time closures in the demersal mixed fisheries in the 
North Sea in relation to by-catch levels of cod. 
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7.1.5 Economic incentives: landing taxes, decommissioning schemes, subsidies 
 
Economic (financial or remunerative) incentives are said to exist where an agent can expect 
some form of material reward, especially money, in exchange for acting in a particular way 
(Dalkir, 2005). There are several risks when applying economic incentives. The first one is 
that incentives can enhance performance, but they don't guarantee that actors will earn them 
by following the most moral or ethical paths. Especially when strong financial incentives are 
in place, ethical boundaries to earn them are more easily crossed. Actors will conve 
themselves that the ends justify the means. Secondly, financial rewards can also create 
inequalities, which in turn can reduce performace. Thirdly, they can reduce intrinsic 
motivation. When actors are willing to cooperate on a voluntary basis, and after a certain 
period a financial reward is given to them, this will change their intrinsic motivation. At the 
moment the reward is withdrawn again, actors will stop their cooperation, because their 
motivation has changed. This called the overjustification effect.   
 
Financial incentives in the form of subsidies are a common place in the fisheries industry, 
although questions about their effectiveness and controllability, about the role of government 
in society and the economy, and about the relative roles of environmental protection and 
economic development have increasingly come up. Subsidies in many areas of the economy 
generally are considered bad things, never more than in fisheries. 
 
Subsidies12 can be categorised as follows: 
- Direct government payments to the industry. E.g. a diverse range of subsidies as 
grants made for the purchase of new fishing vessels, vessel decommissioning 
payments (buybacks), fishermen’s unemployment insurance, compensation for closed 
seasons, equity infusions, and price support programmes 
- Tax waivers and deferrals. This classification includes such programmes as fuel tax 
exemptions for fishing vessel fuel, sales tax exemptions, special income tax 
deductions for fishermen and deferred tax programmes. 
- Government loans and loan guarantees, and insurance. The government may make 
loans to fishermen or fishing firms on favourable terms, such as loans with lower than 
market interest rates or longer than usual amortization periods. Alternatively, the 
government may guarantee repayment of private sector loans when financial 
institutions require added security that cannot be offered by the industry itself. The 
government may offer insurance when private insurers decline to insure fishermen 
because of the perceived highly uncertain risk in the industry. 
- Implicit payments to, or charges against the industry. These are programmes that do 
not transfer funds to the industry and do not waive or defer payments that normally 
would be made by the industry to the government. They may include programmes that 
reduce the prices that industry pays government for goods to below market prices, or 
programmes that may not involve government payments at all. There may also be 
negative subsidy programmes that reduce the profitability of fishing firms. 
- General programmes that affect fisheries  
 
Apart from the above mentioned subsidies that can be introduced to either support existing 
fishers directly or to increase the overall long term economic performance of the fishing fleet, 
landings taxes or input taxes can be imposed at the fishers. The idea of introducing 
input/output taxes is to affect the relative prices and through that ensure that an optimal 
                                                          
12 http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y4647E/y4647e06.htm 
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combination of input/output on the production factors. Furthermore, taxes will make it more 
costly to fish and thereby reduce the fishing effort and catches. This method is optimal from a 
society point of view, but the fishermen will earn less, which could be adjusted for by 
lowering the overall income tax for fishermen. The main argument against taxes is that it is 
costly to manage since taxes should be imposed on every input/output factor. Furthermore, 
fishers will have incentives to find gaps in the system, i.e. the fishers will substitute to input 
measures that are not taxed and thereby avoid the tax restrictions. Large administrative costs 
are thus related to the tax system that should be adjusted continously.  
 
Another conservation measure that uses economic incentives to increase the overall economic 
performance of the fleets is the ITQ system. ITQ is used to ensure that the quotas are 
distributed among the fishers that will gain the highest value of these. Therefore, vessels with 
the lowest marginal costs of fishing will purchase the quotas. Another advantage of ITQ is 
that it allows vessels to adjust their catches to their quota holdings by buying or selling 
quotas, which will reduce the incentives to discard and/or to land fish illegally. Additionally, 
the indidual rights of the system reduce the incentives for fishers to invest in vessel capacity, 
i.e. in a non-right based system vessel capacity investment would give them advantages, since 
it would make them able to catch the fish before somebody else. The current overcapacity of 
the European fleet will thereby be reduced to a more cost-efficient level with ITQ system. An 
often mentioned drawback of the ITQ system is that the distribution of the profit will change 
from many fishers that gain a little each towards fewer owners that gain more each. Of the 
same reason, there are in some countries, such as in the Danish ITQ system for pelagic 
species in the North Sea, restrictions on how large percentage of the total Danish quota that 
one person can own. Similarly, ITQs or ITQ-like systems can also have quite profound 
regional effects by leading to geographical relocation of fishing capacity/rigths, something 
which has also been experienced in the Danish VQS system for demersal fisheries.  
 
 
7.2 Access regulations 
 
While the multiannual plans, and in a wider scale the CFP, are the main regulatory framework 
for most countries in the North Sea, the allocation of the national quota is still a responsibility 
of the national governments. Most member states apply individual rights in various forms in 
the North Sea. Table 7.2.1 gives an overview of the implementation of individual fishing 
rights for the EU member states around the North Sea, for both larger vessels and coastal 
areas.  
 
Every country around the North Sea has special measures adopted for their fleets inside the 
territorial waters. In Germany the fishermen have to have a special license which they can 
typically receive after a three-year training as fisherman. For larger vessels using mobile gear, 
fishermen receive an individual quota for regulated target species from the BLE (German 
Agency for Agriculture and Nutrition) or their cooperative receives it. Smaller vessels using 
static gear need also a special allowance to fish with that gear in certain areas. In most cases 
the total length of gill nets or the number of trap nets is fixed for each individual fisherman. 
Historically fishing rights were with the regional provinces. In Denmark there are restrictions 
as to how much quota can be handled by one vessel and owner, including different 
percentages of the total quota for a species in an area. For example, a vessel can only have a 
maximum of 5% of the national quota for cod in the North Sea within a year.  
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Between Denmark and Sweden agreement has been made to set up specific areas in Kattegat 
in which there are restrictions on fishing or it is altogether prohibited (see Section 4.3.4.2 
above). As a further example, trawling is prohibited in the Sound (ICES SD 23) due to 
shipping concerns. 
 
7.2.1 Natura 2000 Areas in relation to fisheries management measures 
 
In order to declare areas of conservation or species of special interest under the Natura 2000 
framework, each member state often needs to assess whether additional fisheries management 
measures are needed for the area. The European Commission then needs to evaluate this 
fisheries management measures requests, and does it under scientific and other stakeholder 
consultation, especially with the RACs13. In addition to this, the member state has to provide 
for monitoring and control measures for these fisheries management measures in the Natura 
2000 areas.  
 
According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 812/2004 of 26.04.2004 (EC, 2004b) laying down 
measures concerning incidental catches of Cetaceans in fisheries and amending Regulation 
(EC) No. 88/98 pingers must be used on gillnets with mesh sizes from 220 mm and with 
length above  400 m (wreck fishery) operated from vessels above 12 m in length.  
 
No other fisheries management measures in relation to fish trawl and gillnet fishery in the 
North Sea in relation to NATURA 2000 Areas (Figure 7.2.1) are at present in force.  
Fisheries management measures in relation to Natura 2000 areas have been proposed by the 
German government in addition to the closed areas in the cod management plan. A summary 
of the proposed measures can be seen in Table 7.2.2. 
 
Denmark is proposing a ban for bottom trawling in areas mapped as reefs. Some areas are 
already protected, some 4 additional sites will probably be protected soon and a larger number 
later in 2013. In relation to harbor porpoise and seabirds - several studies have been initiated 
in terms of gathering information of bycatch rates. Denmark is at the moment not planning 
any fishery regulation in relation to harbor porpoise and seabirds (besides the above) as the 
results indicate that no alarming bycatch rates exist. Once the initiated projects have been 
finalized decisions will be made. 
 
In the Netherlands, In December 2011, an agreement was signed by four NGOs, the Fish 
product Board, the fishermen’s organisations, and the Ministry of Econoic Affairs regarding 
restriction of fisheries in the North Sea. A quarter of the North Sea will be closed for bottom 
trawling. In 2014, this closure will be extended to almost halve of the the Natura 2000 areas, 
followed by a complete closure in 2016. Also shrimp fisheries will be limited in the coastal 
area and Vlakte van Rhaan14.  
                                                          
13 European Commission, Fisheries measures for marine Natura 2000 sites. 
14 http://www.noordzeenatura2000.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=196&Itemid=178&lang=nl 
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Figure 7.2.1. Natura 2000 areas appointed in relation to Harbor Porpoise in the North Sea. 
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7.3 Compliance monitoring measures 
 
The monitoring of fishing vessel activities at sea is done by the Vessel Monitoring System 
(VMS). VMS are used to allow fisheries regulatory organizations to monitor the compliance 
in spatial and temporal effort allocation by collecting the position, time at a position, and 
course and speed of fishing vessels in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of the EU member 
states.  From 2000, all vessels over 24 m in length were required to transmit their location 
every 2h or less. The legislation was revised in 2005 to include all vessels of 15 m and over 
(EC, 2003). VMS data are further extended in 2012 to include all vessels of 12 m and over. 
VMS enables the authorities to enforce the compliance to any regulated areas for fisheries (by 
monitoring of entry into and exit from specific areas) or to a larger extent to any direct 
constraints on the application of the fishing effort. Hence, VMS is seen as a reliable 
technology capable of producing evidence of vessel activity in relation to e.g. control of 
compliance to spatial regulations and measures such as the case of incursion into a closed area 
to fishing 
 
In European waters, all fishing vessels (larger than 10 meters in length) has according to the 
Data Collection Framework (EU DCF, Commission decision 2008/949/EC) to declare the 
catches into logbooks for every trip at sea, together with several other mandatory information 
(the catch area, the used gear type, the number of days at sea, etc.) so that the regulator can 
monitor and trace the origin of landings and control the total amount simultaneously caught 
by all the vessels in a given area in case of TAC, or the time spent at sea in case of effort 
control. However the obligation does not include the discard part of the catches. When 
commercial vessels are getting rid of unwanted catch of fish, crustacean or other marine 
organism by throwing it over board it is considered to be discard. The amount of yearly 
discard is essential information and necessary input for a trustworthy assessment for most 
stock assessments. Indeed the EU TAC system in practice regulates landings rather than 
catches that put the stocks at risk by creating uncertainties in stock estimates when fisheries 
are managed on certain levels of fishing mortality. The first step into reducing the discard 
problem is to investigate where discard is occurring in larger amounts, to highlight the pattern 
in different fleet components and to document the monitoring of the sampling program. Since 
the introduction of the EU data collection regulation (2002‐ 2008) and the subsequent data 
collection framework (Commission decision 2008/949/EC) monitoring the catches onboard 
commercial fishing vessels has routinely been undertaken by the member states through 
observers on board collecting discard data.  
 
Improved monitoring is reinforced by the introduction of electronic logbooks (into force since 
2012). For example in UK since 2010, fishing vessels have been able to record and report 
fishing activity electronically. The fishing logbook data is transmitted to a central UK hub and 
is accessible on a real time basis to inspectors. The system records and reports, among other 
things, fishing effort, catch on entry or exit and prior notification of entry into port. Cross-
checking with the VMS information is also ongoing. 
 
Improved monitoring is reinforced by mounting video cameras on fishing vessels to report for 
fully documented fishery (Kindt-Larsen et al., 2011). Growing interest in Europe is put on 
alternative management options (for the incoming CFP reform) such as discard bans or total 
catch quota schemes in place of the TAC system alone. Both discard bans and catch quota 
schemes require that both landings and discards be monitored that creates a challenge to 
control and enforce them in practice, because the total catches cannot be determined 
accurately without 100% observer coverage. However, most of these control and enforcement 
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issues can possibly be resolved in most fisheries by the use of cameras on board of each 
vessels e.g. by mounting an imagery unit. The imagery unit is closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) cameras. During all catch events, it recorded overhead views of the working deck 
and catch-handling areas, and closer views of the discard chutes. 
 
On the long run, further insights to support the monitoring of commercial fishing are provided 
using these new technologies and source of data (Ulrich et al. 2012). For example, the access 
by scientists to individual VMS data allows the derivation of more precise estimates of the 
spatial distribution of effort and landings (Bastardie et al., 2010; Hintzen et al., 2012), and 
more in-depth investigation of the links between both. These tools can also supplement other 
particular concerns when assessing e.g. the impact of fleet-specific activities on the sea floor 
and benthic communities, and provide information to the broader marine spatial planning and 
EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). Thanks to these tools, continuous 
improvements on the quantification (nominal vs. effective) and the qualification (e.g., low vs. 
high impact for a given pressure indicator) of the fishing effort are expected to be gained in a 
near future.  
  
STECF (2012f, ANNEX III) recently evaluated the potential for compliance facing the future 
probable management options for the North Sea region (discard ban, individual quotas, gear 
limitations) in terms of Controllability, enforcement tools and cost efficiency, Compliance, 
Obstacles, and Incentives.  STECF states that in order for the management option to achieve 
its objectives it is important that the effect on compliance and enforcement of the entire 
system of management measures is considered. From this perspective it is crucial that the 
control measures:  
• are re-harmonized over regions and MS as far as possible to avoid actual or perceived 
 unfairness.  
• are kept to a minimum to avoid spreading limited control funds over a large number of  
 measures.  
• ensure that the fishers receive the benefits of complying with the rules as well as the 
 bearing the costs of non-compliance.  
• carry appropriate penalties for non-compliance; failure to have sufficiently stringent 
 penalties could incentivize non-compliance.  
• consider incentives for fishers to comply with the rules.  
• are stable over time (as far as possible) to avoid confusion and mistakes.  
• are understood and accepted by the industry  
• are applied in the most cost- efficient way using the appropriate tools and intensity to 
control each management option.  
 
The CCTV-system would improve compliance of reporting rules as well as any potential 
discard ban. However, a system of CQM with some type of discard ban cannot be successful 
if the right surrounding measures are not in place. Systems for receiving undersized or 
unwanted catch in harbors, rules of conducts etc. has to be developed so that compliance is 
not hindered.  
If only part of the fleet is equipped with CCTV, a sense of unfairness that potentially could 
influence compliance could be created. This has to be considered alongside the benefits of 
equipping only parts of the fleet based on a risk based approach. 
 
The initial allocation of Individual vessel/business catch quotas is an important key to achieve 
compliance. In fisheries with a large overcapacity the initial allocation is difficult. 
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Furthermore, the allocation of choke species in fisheries where the national quota of the 
species is very small, due to the relative stability, is difficult. 
 
The usage of certain gears might not be economically optimal which might drive non-
compliance. 
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8.  Management performances 
 
8.1 Conservation 
 
8.1.1 Stock and mixed fisheries management performance 
 
At present (2013-forward), cod is the limiting species for all the North Sea demersal fisheries. 
Following the ‘cod’ scenario (full implementation of the cod management plan), the haddock 
and whiting management plan catch options could not be fully utilized. 
There are new issues raised wrt. mixed-fisheries, and in particular the fact that the relative 
stability is based on historical catch distribution, which may no more reflect the current 
species distribution in a warmer environment. A strong example of this are the problems 
linked to the increasing abundance of Northern Hake in the North Sea. Northern countries 
have only small quotas shares for this stock, and the increasing catches cannot be legally 
landed, leading to large tonnages being discarded. 
 
Cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak and the English Channel: 
ICES has evaluated the EC management plan (EC 1342/2008) and the EU–Norway agreed 
long-term plan in March 2009 and concluded that these management plans are in accordance 
with the precautionary approach only if implemented and enforced within given time frames. 
A joint ICES–STECF group met during 2011 to conduct a historical evaluation of the 
effectiveness of these plans (Kraak et al., 2012). The group concluded that although there has 
been a gradual reduction in F and discards in recent years, the plans for North Sea cod have 
not controlled F as envisaged, and following the current regime is unlikely to deliver FMSY by 
2015. The assessment estimates that SSB in 2012 is still below Blim and although F is now 
below Fpa, it is still largely above any management target. The objective of the EU 
management plan to reduce fishing mortality by 45% in 2011 compared to 2008 has not been 
achieved. The decrease in F from 2008 to 2011 is estimated to be around 9%. While ICES 
considers that a reduction in F has taken place, the intermediate year F assumption from the 
management plan is considered to be over-optimistic (Kraak et al., 2012). An alternative 
assumption for the F in 2012 is made based on the continuation of the F trend from 2006 to 
2010. Following the ICES MSY framework requires fishing mortality to be reduced to 0.10 
(lower than FMSY because SSB 2013 < MSY Btrigger), resulting in landings of less than 10 000 t 
in 2012. This is expected to lead to an SSB of 123 000 t in 2014. To follow the transition 
scheme towards the ICES MSY framework the fishing mortality must be reduced to 
(0.4*0.58) + (0.6*0.10) = 0.29, which is lower than Fpa. This results in landings of less than 
27 600 t in 2013, which is expected to lead to an SSB of 101 000 t in 2014. 
 
Haddock in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
The stipulations of the long term management plan have been adhered to by the EU and 
Norway since its implementation in January 2007. Adherence to the EU–Norway 
management plan has contributed to lower fishing mortality levels and greatly improved 
stability of yield. Discards are highly variable without obvious long-term trend but appear to 
be declining in recent years. Within an ecosystem context, species-specific assessments and 
the latest developments in mixed-fisheries approaches need to be considered. A reduction in 
direct effort on one stock may lead to a reduction or an increase in effort on another and, 
hence, the implications of any changes need to be identified and carefully evaluated.  
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Whiting in the North Sea and Eastern Channel: 
After the considerable revisions in this year’s assessment, caused by new estimates of natural 
mortality, the target F in the long term management plan is no longer considered applicable 
and the management target needs re-evaluation. As an interim measure, it would be 
appropriate to scale the target F in the plan (0.3) according to the proportional change in F 
between the old and new assessment (F revised downwards by around 25% between the 2011 
and 2012). Advice is given for Subarea IV and Division VIId combined. However, TACs are 
set for Subarea IV and Divisions VIIb–k separately and there is no way of controlling how 
much of the Divisions VIIb–k TAC is taken from Division VIId. There should be separate 
management for Division VIId.  
 
Saithe in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
The EU–Norway agreed management plan as updated in December 2008 was evaluated by 
ICES in 2008, and considered to be consistent with the precautionary approach in the short 
term (< 5 years).  
  
Plaice in the North Sea: 
An evaluation of the EU management plan for North Sea plaice and sole (Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 676/2007) by ICES in 2010 concluded that the management plan is precautionary. 
Both the North Sea plaice and sole stocks have been within safe biological limits in the last 
two years. According to the management plan (Article 3.2), this signals the end of stage one. 
Application of the plan is on the basis of transitional arrangements until an evaluation of the 
plan has been conducted (as stipulated in article 5 of the EC regulation). Mesh enlargement in 
the mixed North Sea flatfish fisheries would reduce the catch of undersized plaice, but would 
also result in loss of marketable sole. The current combined sole and plaice long-term 
management plan specifically reduces effort as a management measure. The reduction in 
fishing effort is reflected in reductions in estimated fishing mortality. Mesh enlargement 
would reduce the catch of undersized plaice, but would also result in loss of marketable sole. 
 
Sole in the North Sea: 
The management plan for North Sea sole and plaice (Council Regulation (EC) No. 676/2007) 
was evaluated by ICES in 2010, and ICES concluded that the management plan is 
precautionary. The sole stock has been within safe biological limits in terms of fishing 
mortality since 2008, while SSB has been slightly fluctuating around the biomass limit 
(Bpa=35 kt) since 2008. Both the North Sea plaice and sole stocks have been within safe 
biological limits in the last two years. Consequently, ICES concludes that the objectives of 
stage 1 are currently met and provides advice based on the plan’s TAC setting procedure 
acknowledging to be in a transitional stage at present (as stipulated in article 5 of the EC 
regulation) 
 
 
8.1.2 Ecosystem status and management performance 
 
Broader North Sea ecosystem developments and aspects in relation to harvesting the 
resources and fisheries management is given in STECF (2012e): Development of the 
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM) in European Seas. STECF-11-13. 
The North Sea supplies approximately 1.5 to 2 million tonnes of fish each year, for both 
assessed and non-assessed species (Figure 8.1.1).  
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Figure 8.1.1. North Sea landings 1950-2010 from ICES Statlant. Top: Assessed species; 
Bottom: all species also including non-assessed species). (STECF, 2012e). 
 
Demersal fisheries target roundfish species such as cod (Gadus morhua), haddock 
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus) and whiting (Gadus merlangus) in addition to flatfish species 
such as plaice (Pleuronectes platessa), sole (Solea solea) and a fishery for saithe (Pollachius 
virens). Pelagic fisheries target herring (Clupea harenguss) and mackerel (Scomber scomber) 
and the industrial fisheries target sandeel (Ammodytes spp), Norway pout (Trisopterus 
esmarkii) and sprat (Sprattus sprattus). There are also important crustacean fisheries for 
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nephrops (Nephrops norvegicus), pink shrimp (Panadalus borealis), brown shrimp (Crangon 
crangon) and brown crab (Cancer pagurus).  
Industrial and pelagic species combined have accounted for an increasing proportion of the 
landings, while landings of demersal stocks have declined in line with falling stock sizes and 
regulated reductions in total allowable catches (Figure 8.1.1 top). Total landings for the 
assessed species peaked above 3.5 million tonnes in the late 1960’s and mid 1970’s and have 
remained higher than 3 million tonnes from 1966 to 1977. Since this period of time, despite 
increasing landing of some stocks like sandeels, the total catches exhibit a declining trend, 
with an accelerating decrease since the mid-1990s.  Current reported landings stand at around 
1.5 million tonnes. The landings of the assessed species in the North Sea accounts for the 
major part of the total landings including the non-assessed species (see also below). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1.2.  North Sea landings 1892-2007 (STECF, 2012e). 
 
Total catches of North Sea fish since the turn of the century provide the broader context for 
the decline seen since the mid-1990s (Figure 8.1.2). Some stocks, especially herring and 
secondarily cod, haddock and plaice, were already intensively fished in the late 19th century, 
providing at that time more than 1 million tonnes of landings per year. Landing of these 
species and the total landings as well, regularly increased (except during the two world wars) 
reaching more than 2 million tons in 1956. This changed dramatically in the 1960s. Herring 
accounted for a large majority of catch before 1960, but when this fishery collapsed a wider 
range of the ecosystem became exploited. Total landings increased until the mid-1970s, then 
they decreased significantly in the mid 1990’s. It should be noticed that these statistics 
underestimate total removals because of the prevalence of discarding and also in some periods 
unreported landings. 
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8.1.3 Current status of stocks and mean trajectories:  
The data required to compare the current status of each stock (F*, B*) to the reference points 
(Fpa and Bpa, and Fmsy) were available for 9 stocks in the North Sea ecosystem (Figure 
8.1.3). Among these stocks, cod (Cod-347d) is currently in an unsustainable position with F 
and B beyond the precautionary levels. The Fs value for the North Sea mackerel and sole in 
Division VIId (Eastern Channel) is beyond Fpa, while the sole biomass in Div. IIIa is just 
below Bpa. The North Sea sole and the saithe are in an intermediate situation with mortalities 
between Fpa and Fmsy and biomasses above Bpa. The North Sea Haddock, plaice and the 
Blue whiting combined are currently in a favourable situation with biomasses above Bpa and 
Fs around Fmsy. Note however that only a small fraction of the blue whiting stock is present 
in the North Sea. According to the MSY approach (i.e. in the green area on the figure), over 
the 9 assessed stocks only 3 stocks are in the sustainable zones while 4 stocks are considered 
outside the safe limits of the precautionary approach.  
 
 
   
 
Figure 8.1.3. Status of stocks assessed in the North Sea compared to the precautionary 
approach (pa) and MSY reference points. Left: current state (last assessment for 9 stocks) 
– Right: mean trajectory from 1983 to 2010 (mackerel excluded, cf. § 4.3) (STECF, 
2012e). 
 
The mean trajectory of the average state of the assessed stocks was estimated from 1983 to 
2010 (Figure 8.1.3 right). Until 2005 the stocks were on average in the overfished zone with F 
higher than the precautionary Fpa level and especially in the late 1980s. A clear decrease in 
the mean F is observed in the 2000-2010 period with current F value between Fmsy and Fpa. 
The stocks’ SSB was on average above Bpa over the whole period (1983-2010). It increased 
in the period 2000-2004 but came back in 2010 to the 2000’s level despite the reduction of 
fishing pressure.  
 
8.1.4 Conclusion of the stock synthesis: 
The indicators on stock synthesis show a fluctuating state of the North Sea ecosystem from 
1965 to 1995 when the ecosystem was experiencing very high exploitation rates (highest 
landings since 1950). Total landings from the North Sea had historical high levels between 
2.5 to 3.5 million tonnes per year from 1965 to 1995. From 1995 to 2010 landings decreased 
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significantly to a level of about 1.5 million tons while mean fishing mortality has decreased 
by two-fold from about 0.6 to less than 0.3.The total spawning stock biomass displayed 
decadal oscillations since 1967 with low levels in the 1970’s and 1990’s. Since 2000 the total 
biomass is of about 4 to 5 million tonnes with an increasing trend in the most recent years. 
Despite the decrease of landings and fishing mortality in the last recent decade, the overall 
recruitment has shown a clear decreasing trend (although fluctuating) from 1985 to 2010 to 
reach a recent low index value at about 0.5. The recent increase in the spawning stock 
biomass during the last decade, which is likely due to lower landings and fishing mortality 
levels in the last 15 years, indicate inclinations of the North Sea ecosystem to recover. 
However, this was not converted in higher recruitment levels in the most recent years. Note 
that recruitment might also be influenced by trends in temperature (see under environmental 
indicators below). Although the average fishing mortality was significantly reduced, it just 
reached levels between Fmsy and Fpa in the most recent years and is still higher than the 
Fmsy target. (STECF, 2012e). 
 
 
8.2 Economics 
 
Two commonly used economic performance measures used in fisheries is gross profit and net 
profit. The gross profit is in the DCF defined as the income subtracted variable, semi-variable 
and fixed costs. Net profit is defined as the gross profit subtracted depreciation costs and 
interests, where interests are estimated as the opportunity cost of capital. The developments of 
both gross profit and net profit in the period 2008-2010 are shown in Table 8.2.1. Where the 
development changes from negative to positive profit or vice versa, the development (in 
percentage) does not have any interpretative meaning and is not shown. 
 
There is a clear trend that both the gross profit and net profit has improved from 2008-2010 
for the main fleets of the North Sea, as shown in Table 8.2.1. The only exception is the Dutch 
beam trawlers 18-24m, which gross profit decreased by 89%. The other fleets increased their 
gross profit from 21% and up to 780%, highest for the UK vessels between 18m and 24m 
using demersal trawl and seine. Similarly, the net profit increased from 15%-1302%, highest 
for the Danish vessels larger than 40m using demersal trawl and seine. The positive 
development in economic performance measures could be a result of the structural changes 
that have recently occurred in many fisheries. Especially the movement towards right based 
systems is expected to have had positive effects on reducing the overcapacity and improving 
the economic performance of many fleets.          
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Table 8.2.1: Development in gross profit and net profit for the main North Sea fleets in the 
period 2008-2010. 
 
      Gross profit Net profit 
Country Length 
Gear 
type 2008 2009 2010 
% change 
2008-2010 2008 2009 2010 
% change 
2008-2010 
Denmark 18-24m DTS 9.1 7.5 11.1 21% 0.3 -2.3 0.9 174% 
Denmark 24-40m DTS 10.3 12.9 19.3 88% -1.8 -0.5 6.4 - 
Denmark >40m DTS 48.3 42.4 99.5 106% 4.2 0.8 59.4 1302% 
France >40m TM  -  -3.7 0.4  -   -  -3.7 -0.2 20.7 
Germany 24-40m DTS -9.4 3.0 5.3 - -11.6 1.2 4.0 - 
Netherlands 18-24m TBB 9.5 1.4 1.0 -89% 3.7 -4.7 -4.9 - 
Netherlands 24-40m TBB 1.6 5.9 3.2 105% 0.3 4.5 1.8 498% 
Netherlands >40m TBB 21.5 25.7 32.5 51% 8.1 12.8 21.8 169% 
United Kingdom 0-10m FPO 12.5 12.1 15.7 25% 0.7 1.6 5.3 681% 
United Kingdom 12-18m DTS 7.9 4.9 9.4 19% 3.9 1.7 6.6 70% 
United Kingdom 18-24m DTS 8.3 9.9 18.7 126% -1.5 1.0 10.3 - 
United Kingdom 24-40m DTS 4.0 6.7 35.5 780% -4.7 -1.0 28.4 - 
United Kingdom >40m DTS 5.5 4.4 13.0 136% 3.2 2.1 10.4 226% 
United Kingdom >40m PS 52.7 75.2 64.9 23% 30.8 54.1 35.5 15% 
Total     181.8 208.5 329.5 81% 35.6 67.5 185.9 422% 
Source: Data Collection Framework (DCF) of the European Commission;                                                                                                   
Note: The costs for the French pelagic trawl >40m is not available in DCF for 2008         
 
                                                                                            
8.3  Social aspects 
 
Employment is likely the most telling ‘social’ indicator for which it is actually possible to 
obtain a time series of data on, which can be credibly compared for the different North Sea 
countries.  
 
Overall, employment in fishing, not least in the North Sea, is shrinking and has been so for 
many years. There is a multiplicity of explanations for this, but at least the following deserves 
to be mentioned: 
• individual vessels getting more efficient; 
• consolidation of fleets whereby fewer vessels catch the available resources; and 
• decreasing fishing opportunities in the shape of lower quotas. 
 
In many fisheries dependent regions, not least in the North Sea area, this has resulted in a 
situation, where other sectors such as shipping and food processing (to some extent with 
externally sourced raw materials in the shape of imported fish) have increasingly replaced 
fisheries. Certain ports and municipalities around the North Sea can, however, still be 
considered fisheries dependent, but the number and extent of dependency is decreasing and 
this development can probably be expected to continue, though perhaps not at the same pace 
as recent years.     
 
 
 
 
 60 
 
8.3.1 Development in Employment for Most Recent Years 
 
The data in the following is taken from STECF data (http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). It should 
be noted that the data beneath is national data and as such does not relate to only fishing 
taking place in the North Sea. 
 
Table 8.3.1: Harmonised data on number of FTE fishers for the most recent years: 2008 – 
2010 
 
 2008 2009 2010 
Denmark 1716 1544 1504 
Netherlands 2200 2007 2006 
United Kingdom 8163 7104 6918 
Belgium 380 335 352 
Germany 1384 1027 1149 
Based on data from STECF Annual Economic Report 2012 appendices: 
http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/366433/2012_EWG+12-
05_EU+FLEET+ECONOMIC+AND+TRANSVERSAL+DATA_FS+LEVEL.xlsx  
 
The short time-series in Table 8.3.1 above shows the trend towards fewer and fewer fishers. 
From 2008 to 2010 all the countries witnessed a reduction in the number of FTE fishers. For 
Germany and Belgium there seems however, to have been a smaller increase from 2009 to 
2010.  
The raw numbers of fishers also tells a story of a sector that in reality, at least in the 
prosperous countries around the North Sea, provides very few jobs. It should be noted, 
though, that fishing generates landbased activities as well, which are not included in the 
numbers above.  
 
8.3.2 A Longer Perspective on Development in Employment 
 
The overall development in the number of fishers stands out more clearly, if we take a longer 
perspective. Table 8.3.2 beneath shows the development of FTE fishers in Denmark for the 
period 2002 to 2009. The development is in many ways remarkable. Though, it should also be 
noted that Denmark is the country, which has witnessed the greatest relative reduction in the  
number of fishers in the EU countries around the North Sea in the period. 
 
Table 8.3.2: FTE (National Data) Fishers in Denmark: 2002-2009 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
FTE 
Fishers 
4.038 3.643 3.315 2.951 2.635 1.917 1.722 1.546 
Based on data from STECF: http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/256769/2011_EWG+11-
16_EU+FISHING+FLEET+ALL+ECONOMIC+AND+TRANSVERSAL+DATA.zip  
 
As evident from Table 8.3.2, the number of FTE fishers in Denmark has been reduced by 
more than 60 percent in the course of a very limited number of years. Although this is of 
course also related to the developments in catching opportunities and efficiency gains on 
behalf of individual vessels, in the Danish context a major driver has also been the 
incremental introduction of ITQs in pelagic fisheries and an ITQ-like system in the demersal 
fishery, which has led to a marked consolidation of the fleet and hence a very noticeable 
decrease in the number of operating fishing vessels. 
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Similar trends, although not quite so dramatic, can be seen for the other North Sea countries. 
The number of FTE fishers in the UK has been halved over the period. In Germany one-third 
of the fishermen have left the sector, which is a little more than in Belgium. Netherlands has 
been the country with the most stable number of fishermen over the period with a decrease of 
20 percent. 
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9. Conclusions 
 
Management of the demersal roundfish and flatfish fisheries in the North Sea is conducted 
mainly through the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the yearly EU-Norway Bilateral 
Fishery Agreements. The prevailing management system and principle has been landing 
quotas (TAC, Total Allowable Catch) mainly based on the EU principle of relative stability in 
the international sharing of the TAC. Also, general effort limitations and technical measures 
are set for the EU and Norwegian fisheries on top of the TAC regulations. Technical measures 
have mainly aimed at reducing the retention and discard of the juveniles through gear 
measures and to protect the spawners and/or recruits in the fish populations through closures. 
Furthermore, the management is based on a set of national measures especially concerning 
control and enforcement measures, national distribution of the overall TAC, individual special 
technical measures, allocation (distribution) of national TACs to different fisheries and 
vessels including the share to e.g. Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) or Vessel Quota 
Shares (VQSs).  
 
The management of the North Sea demersal fisheries has changed quite a lot over the last 
decades following the need to rebuild the fish stocks, and in particular the North Sea cod 
stock in relation to the present case study. The CFP has increasing focus towards 
implementing multi-annual or long term management plans (MAMPs, LTMPs) partly to 
avoid the annual political battles over setting the TAC. There has furthermore been a trend 
during the last decade to move away from the Precautionary Approach and towards 
Maximum Sustainable Yield as the overarching management objective and Harvest Control 
Rules (HCRs) based on this. There have been introduced increasingly restrictive fisheries-
based effort limitations with possibilities for exemption or for less drastic effort reductions 
provided that cod avoidance behavior can be demonstrated. Although the decision-makers 
under the CFP have had a reputation of consistently setting TACs way above the scientific 
advice, the development in recent years has been towards this gap being reduced. 
 
Management of the fisheries has undergone a number of structural and behavioral changes, 
and these have already yielded some positive results as the state of the demersal stocks in the 
North Sea have globally improved. The status of main demersal stocks has considerably 
improved over the last decade. Fishing mortality has globally decreased and biomass has 
increased, and most of the assessed demersal stocks are now within sustainable limits. Some 
issues remain with North Sea cod, for which recovery is slower. At present, cod is the limiting 
species for all the North Sea demersal fisheries. Over a time span from the 1960s landings of 
demersal stocks have declined with an accelerating decrease since the mid-1990s in line with 
the falling stock sizes and regulated reductions in total allowable catches (TACs). A clear 
decrease in the mean fishing mortality (F) is observed in the 2000-2010 period with current F 
values between Fmsy and Fpa, and the spawning stock biomass (SSB) has on average been 
above Bpa for the period 1983-2010 for the assessed stocks. The effort in the central North 
Sea and along the Norwegian waters has decreased as well as the number of operating fishing 
vessels (capacity). Overall, the nominal effort (kW-days) by European fleets using demersal 
trawl, seine, beam trawl and gillnet in the North Sea, Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel have 
been substantially reduced (-20% between 2003 and 2011). Since 2000, the total fish biomass 
for exploited stocks in the North Sea is about 4-5 million tonnes with an increasing trend in 
the most recent years. Despite the decrease of landings and fishing mortality in the last recent 
decade, the overall recruitment has shown a clear decreasing trend from 1985-2010. The 
recent increase in SSB during the last decase, which is likely due to lower landings and 
fishing mortality levels in the last 15 years, indicate inclinations of the North Sea ecosystem 
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to recover. However, this has not converted in higher recruitment levels in the most recent 
years in which there may be a time delay. 
 
There is a clear trend that both the gross profit and the net profit has improved from 2008-
2010 for the main fleets of the North Sea with the only exception of the Dutch beam trawlers 
18-24m, for which the gross profit decreased by nearly 90%. The positive development in 
economic performance measures can be a result of the structural changes that have recently 
occurred in many fisheries. There are fewer vessels sharing the available resources (reduction 
in over-capacity). Especially, the movement towards right-based systems is expected to have 
had positive effects on reducing the over-capacity and improving the economic performance 
of many fleets. Historically, EU subsidies over the years have contributed to making the fleet 
more efficient, so the success of the CFP in the area of developing an efficient fleet has 
historically contributed to its failure in relation to conserve fish stocks, as overcapacity is 
consistently mentioned as one of the fundamental reasons for the conservation failure 
historically.  
 
Employment in fishing as a social indicator is shrinking, not least for the North Sea, and has 
been so for many years. There are multiple explanations for this: i) individual vessels are 
getting more efficient, ii) consolidation of fleets whereby fewer vessels catch the available 
resources with noticeable decrease in number of operating fishing vessels, and iii) decreasing 
fishing opportunities in the shape of lower quotas. The raw number of fishers tells a story of a 
sector that in reality, at least in the prosperous countries around the North Sea, provides only 
few jobs.   
 
Despite the above trends indicating positive effects of the most recent fisheries management 
of the North Sea mixed demersal fisheries there are a row of general problems in the present 
management.  
 
Population dynamics with respect to recruitment variations, sub-populations and changes in 
distribution of several demersal North Sea stocks influenced by environmental factors besides 
fishery are not fully understood and taken into consideration in management (and 
management advice). Also, biological multi-species interactions between the stocks are not 
fully taken into account in the management of the stocks when setting the MSY management 
and exploitation limits for the stocks. Management is not based on broader ecosystem and 
multi-species objectives, but based mainly on single stock objectives. 
 
Also technical interactions between fisheries are not taken fully into account in management 
of the North Sea demersal fisheries. The fisheries targeting cod, whiting, haddock, saithe, 
flatfish and Nephrops in the North Sea and Kattegat-Skagerrak are mixed demersal fisheries 
for towed gears. Mixed fisheries considerations are of primary importance for the 
management of North Sea species. Single stock management is a cause of discarding in mixed 
fisheries, because individual stock management objectives may not be consistent with each 
other. As such, the TAC of one species may be exhausted before the TAC of another, leading 
to catches of valuable fish that cannot be landed resulting in over-quotas discard. 
  
Overall, present management and fisheries policy is characterized by the CFP having in many 
ways taken  form of a classical intergovernmentalist, state-centric command-and-control, top-
down management system, where member states’ ministers in the Council have exercised 
strong control over the fisheries management measures which have been developed and 
adopted on the background of proposals from the Commission and the Parliament, though 
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since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty the Parliament has assumed a role of co-legislator 
alongside the Council. EC has identified the lack of stakeholder involvement as one of the 
major weaknesses of the CFP, recognizing that this fact clearly undermine its legitimacy. 
Establishment of the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) with the 2003 CFP can be seen as 
the first formal attempt to generate a network of multi-national, multi-interest advisory 
organizations with a strong regional focus among other involving resource users in the 
decision making. However, the RACs have at present only an advisory function on decisions 
and are not formally integrated directly in management on a regional basis, i.e. the RAC 
system is primarily intended to provide a regional stakeholder perspective to the 
Commission’s deliberations rather than providing stakeholders with real decision-making 
authority. RACs constitute, nevertheless, a move towards regionalization of the fisheries 
policy. 
 
Present management is, furthermore, characterized by a high degree of complexity, 
bureaucracy, and examples of micro-management where different management systems and 
measures are implemented in parallel making evaluation of impact of the individual measures 
and systems very complicated and the system suffers from lack of transparency. With respect 
to the complexity the different management measures are acting top of each other with impact 
on the same fisheries and stocks at the same time (and with time overlap in their 
implementation) creating a very complex management and associated advisory system, where 
it is difficult to distinguish specific effects and impacts of each individual measures 
implemented. Accordingly, it is also very difficult to make scientific management evaluation 
and advice associated to the individual measures.  
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